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-·
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MA~SFIELD (D., MONT.)
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL,INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS
JULY 25, 1973

Mr. Chairman,
I want to begin by thanking you for the invitation to address
this Committee on the question of U.S. forces in Europe--as well
as on the broader context in which we must place our consideration,
the question of

u.s.

military forces around the world.

The United States currently has stationed on foreign soil over
500,000 military personnel.

11

In addition, over 100,000 military

y
personnel are afloat off foreign shores.

Almost 30% of our

military forces are stationed beyond our homeland.

Not since the

days of the British Empire or probably more truly, the Roman Empire,
have so many been required to "maintain the peace" away from their

*

shores.
I believe it is important to view the question in the broad
context of U.S. forces stationed around the world.

It has been

painfully evident and generally agreed in the United States Senate
for at least the last several years that the United States is badly

_v.

See Appendix A.

~/.

Ibid.

*
The percentage of u.s. forces stationed overseas was even
higher during some years since World war II.
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over-extended abroad.
We must not forget the lesson of the tragic war in Vietnam;
for that tragedy will only be compounded if we refuse to learn
and guide our actions accordingly.
The National Commitments Resolution passed overwhelmingly
by the Senate was significant evidence of the prevailing sentiment
in the Senate.

ll

The war Powers legislation passed overwhelmingly

i/
by both Houses of Congress is another significant step.
But these vital actions reform and refine our institutional
mechanisms.

They serve notice of the Congressional threshold

of tolerance.

They demonstrate a Congressional attitude that seeks

a greater share of responsibility.
are

not enough.

But these constructive changes

We must accept the realization that our commit-

ments and policies are not always made in formal and traditional
ways.

In fact, some policies seem to "just happen."
The presence of so many

a policy.

u.s.

forces on foreign soil

~s

such

Their presence presumes a policy that heavily favors

the military option.

The War Powers legislation expresses

ll-

Congressional Record, Permanent Ed., June 25, 1969, p. 17245,
9lst Cong., 1st Sess.
4/. Congressional Record, July 18, 1973, p. H-6283; July 20,
1973, p. S-14226, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
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Congressional dissent to that emphasis.

But the fundamental

difficulty in discerning semblance to America's policy abroad is
that the commitment and level of U.S. forces abroad has determined
our policy rather
forces abroad.

~han

our policy determining the level of

u.s.

The intractability of executive branch attituJe

on force levels abroad during the past 25 years can only be explained by the incapacity of the policy-makers to perceive that
the troops on foreign soil was our policy and policy-makers were
really articulating after-the-fact rationalizations.

Members

of the Executive Branch, whether in office for two weeks, two
months, two years or two decades, have had the same theme, and
it is always one that the world will fall if any of our soliders
return

home.

But yearning to return horne shall become more compelling with
each passing month.

The impoundment by this Administration of

$12 billion for domestic needs; the closing of many U.S. military
bases as an economy measure, putting many Americans out of work;
the devaluation of the dollar by more than 25% over the past
two years; all will join in marshalling attention to what heretofore
has been considered an issue that should be left to the "experts."
I believe the arguments this year will be heard.

-4-

As I stated above,

the plain fact is that the United States

stations over 600,000 military forces outside the United States
and its territories and possessions.

We maintain

over 2,000

21

There are over 314,000
~
dependents stationed overseas accompanying these forces.
The
bases and installations on foreign soil.

Defense Department employs directly or indirectly approximately
173,000 foreign nationals at these bases overseas to support these

u.s.

21
forces abroad.

These are not reasons for bringing our

troops home, but they are facts that should make America listen
to the reasons.
The most detailed focus can be obtained on Europe.

At least

in 1950 the Congress was asked to participate in that decision of
sending troops to that Continent.
can be raised as well to the

u.s.

But equally forceful questbns
troop commitments in Thailand--

now about 45,000: or in Okinawa, about 40,000; or Korea, about
42,000; or Taiwan, about 8,000; or the Philippines, about 15,000;
or Japan, about 18,000; or even Bermuda where about 1,000 men defend

8/
our national interests.

2/.

Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Installations and Logistics, Sept, 16, 1972.

6/.

See Appendix B.

21.

See Appendix

8/.

See Appendix A.

c.
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Let us look at Europe when NATO was first structured.

Let

us look at the realities that faced this Nation at that time
which precipitated the commitment of four divisions to Europe.
Let us look at the premises upon which the Congress assented to
this commitment of these divisions and the representations that were
made at that time about the permanence of such a commitment of
manpower abroad.

Then let us look at Europe and the U.S. today,

28 years after the War, 23 years after the initial stationing
of these divisions to NATO
EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II
World War II left Western Europe in ruins.

The general

view in the West was that the communist monolith under Stalin had
the domination of the entire planet as its goal.

The United States

moved swiftly with the most massive reconstruction effort ever
attempted with its Marshall Plan--an effort that has proven
successful beyond expectations.

The institutions of Europe,

political, economic as well as military, were in shambles.

With

these weakened conditions in Europe combined with the common
~/

perception of the threat of the hordes from the East

~/.

a

Adam Ulan, Expansion and coexistence (New York, 1968) pp.414-415.

-6-

strong military presence in Western Europe to compliment the
economic effort was rational.

But the North Atlantic Treaty

itself did not commit U.S. troops to the European continent for
deterrence.

In fact,

the treaty itself made no commitment of

U.S. ground troops to Europe.

It was not until 1951 that the

decision was made to send four land divisions to Europe and
Congressional assent solicited to this significant commitment of
troops.
The history of proceedings before the Congress are very
revealing.
Secretary Marshall claimed at that time that there was nothing
magical about four divisions.

The full level was selected based

upon a judgment of our resources and their availability.
the same standard were to be applied today.

If only

And why should it

~/

not be applied?
But even more revealing ls th e exchange that Senator

JQ/. SENATOR GILLETTE.

Just one additional question. There is
no magic formula in the four plus two divisions, as I understand it?
SECRETARY MARSHALL.
It is just a combination of considerations
that we have had to turn over in our minds.
SENATOR GILLETTE. Taking into consideration a number of factors,
the immediate availability of troops and the fact that we want to
make, in our opinion, a move, take a course that will give some
reassurance to our allies that we are taking into consideration our
resources and their availability, the formula of £our plus two was
reached?
SECRETARY MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

-7-

Hickenlooper had with Secretary Acheson when it was made clear by
Secretary Acheson that the original NATO Treaty envisioned no
troops stationed in Europe by the United States and that it was
clear that each signatory to the NATO Treaty would unilaterally
make its own determination of its contribution of military equipment, manpower and facilities.

D./

In addition, Secretary Acheson

lQI, cont'd. from page 6.
SENATOR GILLETTE. And there is nothing magic about it?
SECRETARY MARSHALL. No, certainly not ....
Hearings on "Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to
Duty in the European Area, " February, 1951, Committee on Foreign
Relations and Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 82nd
Congress, lst Sess i on.
11/. SENATOR HICKENLOOPER . . . . I do say to you that without any
doubt in my mind, the North Atlantic Pact proposition was sold to a
great many Memb ers of the Congress on the idea that prior to aggression we would not be called upon to implement the land armies
of Western Europe by large numbers of troops ....
Now, may I ask you, has the policy changed, or is this a
new proposition? Has your position changed? Apparently it has, but
I would like to have you comment on it.
SECRETARY ACHESON. I shall be glad to comment on what you
have just stated.
The question which you asked me was understood by me as it has
just been understood by Senator Smith, and that was whether, under
article 3 of the treaty, we were expected, in the sense of were we
undertaking a commitment, to send ground troops to Europe.
I replied to you that the answer to that is a clear and absolute "no."
we were not undertaking a commitment by article 3 of that treaty to
do anything except to work with our allies to establish individual
and collective defense.
I think it was clearly understood that way by the committee,
which you will remember, and I should like to recall to you that

-b-

envisioned the return of troops subsequently sent if the situation
got better.
But what conditions were envi sio ned in 1951 that initially

11/,

cont.d from page 7 .
that committee, in its report, said, under this article 3 :
Realistic assessment of the defensive capacity
necessary to resis t aru1ed aLtack will be a function of
the organization to be established under article 9.
And it goes on:
On the basis o f this assessment, each party would determine
for itself what it could most effectively contribute in
the foru1 of facilities , m1l1tary equipment, production
capacity, manpower, etc .
This decision would be taken in
the light of the resources and geographical location of
the indiv1dua l state , and wlth due regard to its economic
stability. There is no specif1c obligation as to the timing,
nature, and extent of assistance to be given by any party.
That is exactly in accordance with my understanding then and now,
and that was what I thought was being asked, and to that I was
responding.
SENATOR HICKENLOOPER.
I am trying to find out whether this lS
only the camel gettinJ its head under the tent, and whether the
4 divisions will require 6 more and then the 10 will require 12 more,
and where we are going, what we have to look forward to? In view
of the fact that we did not contemplate sending any substantial
numbers of ground troops to implement the North Atlantic Treaty,
and now the scenes have shifted and we are being edged in, not by
the back door but by the front door, with divisions of troops
which at llist I did not contemplate we were going to send or intended
to send, I am wondering where the end of this matter is.
In the
long run will we be put into the inevitable position of assuming
the primary responsibility for the land defense of Europe.
I am
concerned as to whether or not we are going to get ourselves in
that position by this piecemeal attrition method, or whether our
commitments on land fo rces at the moment meet our reasonable
obligations under the defense program as it is now contemplated.
SECRETARY ACHESON.
Senator, I think you are asking me quite

-9-

warranted the troops to go to Europe and what thorny questions
should be resolved for us to expect their return.

Senator Smith

of New Jersey sought this informat1on from General Bradley 1n
1951 and General Bradley felt tho making of a peace treaty with
Germany and the state

~f

preparedne s s of the other nations of

Europe as well as the aggress1 ve 1ntentions of the East were the
chief irritants that Justifi e d U. S. action.

w

111, cont'd. from page 8 .
impossible questions.
I do not know.
In the first place, you say,
Are we going to be asked to take over the land defense of Europe?
The answer is, of course , we are not going to be asked to take
over the defense, t he land defense of Europe.
If you ask me whether
in the future we may be asked to send more than six divisions, how
can I possibly answer that? I suppose if there is war you w1ll.
Maybe if the situation gets better it will be less. Maybe if it
stays the same it will be the same. Maybe if it gets more tense,
there may be some additions to it. 2£· cit.
~/.

SENATOR SMITH(N.J.). Now , the immediate question I want to
ask you is this: Are we building up this European Army by putting
our divisions there a t t he moment , in order to deter an aggression
while they are getting their strength built up. Will the time come
when they will be able to defend themselves entirely without our
aid so far as Europe is concerned?
In other words, can we look upon this as a gradually reducing
contribution to the European Army of our United States forces, as
we did on the Marshall plan from an economic standpoint? We started
substantially and reduced until we do not have to give any more.
Now, is our support, ground support, of a Wes~ern European
army on the same principle? Is it on the principle of giving them
strength and giving them courage to go ahead and set up their force,
but as they get their own strength we will gradually withdraw from
there and keep our forces mobile for any part of the world where
they may strike?
GENERAL BRADLEY.
I think the question of whether a military

- 10The se were all val i d conce rn s in 1951 .

I n add i tion, lt was a

ti me wh e n th e Ko r e a n War was und erway; China was an active enemy ;
the S ov j ets had come of nuc l ear age;

the South East European f l ank

was still threatened; the economies of Western Europe were Just back
on their feet; politica l instability was p r eva l ent in most West
European count r ies .

ll/ ,

Strong men replaced strong institutions and

cont'd. from page 9 .
contribution to Europe would be a decreasing one is almost an impossible one to answer at this time.
So much depends upon the making
of a peace treaty with Germany and the state of preparedness of the
other nations , the continued aggressive moves on the part of other
nations that are presently opposed to us, and their ideology.
I
think, Senator Smith, that is. a rather long-range questlon to whlch
any answer at this time would not be worth much .
SENATOR SMITH(N . J.).
The only reason I asked you the quest1on
is because I understood in talking with General Eisenhower that he
thought we might think in terms of an approach similar to the
Marshall plan from an economic standpolnt:
that what we are
trying to do now is trying to put spirit into the European natlons
that may be fearful that we are not giving them support . They need
it now more than they will a little later .
They need it possibly
GENERAL BRADLEY.
I think that is true.
more now. And, if you can look far enough ahead to the time when
France has 50 or 60 divisions and those other countries have similar
size forces , the time might arrive when we cou l d withdraw our forces
altogether , and certainly when you get a peace treaty with Germany
you are going to be faced with the question of reduction of forces,
because some of these people are on occupation duties now; but that
apparently is sometime in the future , and I would prefer not to try
to answer your question, which in my opinion is based on conditions
which are going to exist a considerable time in the future , and
I can perceive of circumstances being possible which would permit
us to withdraw entirely , but I say that is certainly going to be
sometime off . QE. cit.

-ll-

provided the cohcslon
questions were raised:

f~r

Western Europe .

But even the n the

Should the U. S . commit Lour d i v i sions to

Europe as a deterrent lo another European war at least unt1l
Europe ls ready

~o

assume its own

def~nses .

'l'he Congress a s sented to that reques·.. and
returned to Europe to meet the
time .

Lhru~c

*-~1e

Arrer i can troops

that was perceived at that

However real the tilrc..at ther. , has it chunged since that time?
EUROPE SINCE TIIE ' SO's
When U.S. troops \·;ere initi a lly commicted to the Eu r opean

continen t ,

total GNP of all European NATO countries was $46 . 9
l]_/
billion c:ompa red to 5831.9 billion for 1972 .
The era of
confront a t ion was hlgh and the national inscitutions we r e weak .
Inte r relati o nships were virtually non-existent .

Let us look at

and contrast the economic exchange:
1951
U. S .
U. S .
U. S .
U. S .

imports
exports
imports
exports

1972

from l!SSR- ---- --- -- --- -- - -$27 . 4million $ 95 . 5million
to USSR---------------- - -- O. lmilli on 546 . 7mi lli on
320 . lm il lion
from Eastern Europe - - ----- 63 . 8m i lli o n
to Eastern Europe
2 . 8milli on 818 . 2ml llion

The total exports from all NATO countries to the USSR and
Eastern Europe ln 197L amounted to $9 . 89 billion.

The imports

from the USSR and Eastern Europe to NATO countries totaled
14/
In t:his one area alon e of trade between the blocs ,
$8 . 67 bi l lion .

lll ·
1·4 / .

See Appendix D
Ib id .
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the most dramatic change in climate must be recosnized.
But even more significant than evaluating not only the
strength of Western Europe and appreciating the strong trade
flow between East and West lS the

gr~at

number of events s1nce

1963 that manifest as well as signiflcantly contrlbutc to the

lessening of tensions between East and West .
eighty-two events I cons1der

si~nificant

I have selected

1:2/
since 1963.

They

range from the hot line to the Nuclear Test Ban to the Consular
Convention to the Non-prollferatiL· n Treaty to the treat·y nonnalizins

15/. EVENTS FROM 1963 TO 1973 WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTED TO
THE LESSENING OF TENSIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST:
1.
Renewal of Franco-Soviet trade agreement . Ft:bruary 1963.
2.
U.S.-USSR agreement to establish an emergency communications line (hot llne).
June 1963.
3.
Tripartite treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.
October 1963.
4.
Approval by President Kennedy of U.S. wheat sales to the
USSR. October 1963.
5.
U.S.-USSR agreement of exch~ges in the scientific,
technical, educational, cultural, and other fields.
February 1964 .
6.
U.S. restores MFN treatment to Yugoslavia and Poland.
March 1964.
7.
Renewal of U.S.-USSR trade agreement. April 1964.
8.
U.S. Romanian trad e discuss1ons.
May 1964.
9.
U.S.-USSR consular agreement.
Signed June 1964.
Ratlfied March 1967.
10.
French-Soviet trade agreement. September 1964.
11.
U.S.-USSR agreement on cooperation in desalination of
sea water.
November 1964.
12.
Warsaw Pact Political Constulative Committee approval
of the Rapacki suggestion for a conference on European security.
January 1965.

-13relations between

Ge1~any

and Poland; to the Sovlet-West German

agreement on consulates; to the German treaties with Soviet Union;
to the SALT treaty; to the s1gning of the treaty on relations
between East and West Germany.

But to many the threat of an all-

out conventional war with the hordes from the East remains the same.
Rigidity affects not only the rhetoric but the policy .

General

Eisenhower testifying in 1951 about Congressional responsib1lity
in the determination and the evolution of the level of U.S. troops

121,

cont'd. from page 12
13 .
Franco-Soviet color television agreement.
March 1965 .
14.
Italo-Soviet agreement on joint cooperation in peaceful
uses of atomic energy. October 1965.
15. U.S.-USSR consular convention .
December 1965.
16 .
Italo-Soviet cultural agreement.
February 1966.
17.
Italo-Soviet economic, scientific, and technical
cooperation agreement. April 1966.
18. Yugoslavia becomes full contracting party to GATT . April 1966 .
19. De Gaulle's visit to the USSR .
June 1966 .
20.
Franco-Soviet space resear~h agreement.
June 1966.
21.
Franco-Soviet scientific, technical , and economic
agreement .
June 1966.
22.
Fiat-Soviet agreement for construction of a Fiat factory
in Russia. August 1966.
23 .
Renault and Peugeot agreements with the USSR ~egarding
cooperation with Soviet motor industry .
October 1966.
24.
Kosygin's visit to France. December 1966.
25.
Establishment of joint Franco-Soviet permanent commlss1on.
December 1966.
27.
Establishment of joint Franco-Soviet chamber of commerce.
December 1966.
28.
North Atlantic Ministerial Council declaration emphasizing
a willingness to explore ways of developing cooperation with the
USSR and the states of Eastern Europe. December 1966 .

-14~n

Europe said ,
I do think that Congress ought to see a respectable,
reasonable approach, and the second they sec anythiny to
be, let's say, coc k eyed and crazy , to get into the thjny
with both feet. ~/
Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the time has come when Congress

must recognize that in the words of General Eisenhower , something

l2f, cont'd. from page 13.
29 . Franco-Sov~et atomic energy cooperation agreement.
January 1967.
30. Franco-Soviet trade agreement . January 1967 .
31. Kosygin visit to the United Kingdom.
February 1967 .
32. Fanfani visit to Moscow. May 1967.
33 .
Italo-Soviet agreement on coope r at~on in tourism.May 1967.
34.
Italo-Soviet consular convention . May 1967 .
35 .
Poland becomes full contracting member of GATT . June 1967.
36.
U.K .- USSR establish London-Moscow teleprinter line.
August 1967.
37. Harmel Report of North Atlantic Council proposes discussion
of mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe.
December 1967.
38 . Announcement of plans for joint Franco-Soviet space
research. January 1968.
39 .
Prime Minister Wilson's visit to the USSR . January 1968.
40. U.K .-USSR scientific and technological agreement.
41 . NATO declaration calling for discussions of mutual and
balanced force reductions . June 1968.
42. Signature of the non-proliferation treaty on nuclear
weapons . July 1968.
43 . Natural gas delivery contract consummated between the
State of Bavaria and the USSR . September 1968.
44 . U. K.-USSR civil air agreement. December 1969.
45. Franco-Soviet civil air agreement. December 1969.
46 . Italo-Soviet long-term agreement on the supply of Soviet
natural gas to Italy.
December 1969 .

'

-15is cockeyed about

u.s.

troops stationed abroad.

President

Eisenhower later recogn1zed that change was justified.

He stated

in 1963 that one U.S. d1v1sion would be suff1c1ent to fulfill our
Q/
commitment to NATO.
It is evident from these 1nd1cia of engagement with the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that the tension that ex1sted
in the early 'SO's has changed significantly.

Further movement

J2/, cont'd. from page 14.
47. Soviet-West German agreements on supply of Soviet natural
gas to West Germany.
February 1970.
48. Opening in Vietnna of U.S.-USSR negotiations on strategic
arms limitation (SALT). April 1970.
49.
NATO declaration on mutual and balanced force reductions.
May 1970.
50. Signing of non-aggression treaty between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. August 1970.
51. President Pompidou's visit to the USSR. October 1970.
52. Signing of Franco-Soviet protocol on Franco-Soviet
political cooperation. October 1970.
53. Signing of treaty of normalization of relations between
the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland. December 1970.
54. Creation of a new basis for SALT negotiations. May 1971.
55. Ouster of hard -lin e East German Communist leader,
Walter Ulbricht. May 1971.
56.
Resumption of SALT negotiations. July 1971.
57. Soviet-West German agreement to open consulates in
Hamburg and Leningrad. July 1971.
58. Signature of first part of quadripartite agreement on
Berlin. September 1971.
59. Chancellor Brandt's visit to the USSR. September 1971.
60. U.S.-USSR agreement on exchanging information on certain
missile testing activities. September 1971.
61. U.S.-USSR agreement on improving the "hot line" between
Washington and Moscow. September 1971.
62. Secretary Brezhnev's visit to France. October 1971.
63. Franco-Soviet agreement on economic, technical and
industrial cooperation.
October 1971.

-16-

has been proposeJ between East and West.

As President Nlxon

stated to a Joint Sesslon of the Congress on June 1, 1972:
By forming habits of cooperation and strengthening
institutional tles .n areas of peaceful enterprlse, these
four agreements (Moscow sunmnl, May 1972) to whlch I have
referred will create on both sldes a stearlily growlng vested
interest in the malntenance of <JOOd relations between our
two countries.
Expanded United Statcs-Sovlet trade will also yleld
advantages to both of o 1r nations. When the two l<1rgest
economies ln the world start tradlng wlth each other on a
much larger scale, ll'.'lng standards in both natlons ,..,lll
rise an d the stake whl~h both have ln peace will lncrease.

12/,

cont'd. from page 15.
64.
Romanla becomes a full contracting party to GATT.
November 1971.
65. Sovi et-West German clvil a1r agreemen t .
November 1971.
66.
Ratlficatlon by che West German parl1ament of the West
German treatles wlth the Soviet Unlon and Poland. May 1972.
67.
Presldent Nlxon's vislt to Moscow. May 1972.
68.
U.S.-USSR agreement on coopera t 1on ln the explor<ltlon of
outer space. May 1972.
69.
U.S.-USSR agreement on cooperat1on in solvlng problems
of the environment.
I·lay 1972.
70. U.S.- USSR agreement on JOlnt efforts in the fleld of
medical sclence and publlc health . May 1972.
71.
U.S.-USSR agreement on expanded cooperat1on in sc1ence
and technology and th£ establishment of a JOlnt comm1ssion for
this purpose. May 19 2.
72.
U.S.-USSR agreement on coope ration between the American
and Soviet navies to reduce Lhe chances of dangerous lncidents.
May · l972.
73. Signing of the SALT Treaty. May 1972.
74. Signing of the final quadripartite agreement on Berlin.
June 1972.
75.
U.S.-USSR three yea r agreement on the export of U.S. agricultural commodllies(especlally wheat and feed grains). July 19 72 .
76. Settlement of USSR lend-lease obligations. October 1972.
77. U.S.-USSR mar1time agreement.
October 1972.
78.

Sign1ng of U.S.-USSR commercial treaty.

October 1972.

-17It is tLme that the U.S. recognized the existence of its
own policy toward the East.
be cons is tent,

The policy of thls government should

not one of engagement with the Soviet Union in

trade and cultural exchange and confrontation 1n military matters.
There should be but one barolo'eter by which this government guides
its actions toward the East.
But we have many barometers that provide such different readings for the same phenomenon.

This dual standard for rationalizing

our policies v1s-a-vis the Eastern bloc cannot withstand thoughtful
focus.

If our policy toward the East is predicated upon a desire

to open markets and d e velop a mutual interdependency of East.and
West upon each other, that policy will yield benefits beyond the
economic sphere as they have with increased cultural and educational exchanges.

It is a natural evolution of the events of the

121.

cont'd. from page 16.
79. Quadripartite declaration supporting East and West German
membership in the United Nations.
November 1972.
80. Signing of the basic treaty on relations between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.
December 1972.
81. Opening of preparatory talks in Vienna for negotiations on
mutual and balanced force reductions. January 1973.
82. Soviet-West German 10-year agreement on the development
of economic, industrial, and technical cooperation, and cultural
and educational exchanges. May 1973.

1..§./. Hearings on "Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to
Duty in the European Areas~" February, 195l,Committee on Foreign
Relations and Committee on Armed Services,U.S.S.,82nd, 1st Sess.
17/."Saturday Evening Post," October 26, 1973, page 27.

-18of the past decade.

But ln lhe military sphere -- in the NATO

structure--what remains is a stale rigidity; a resort to
old rationalizat i ons from bygon e years .
But the double standard is not new , even within our own
Alliance.

Our

Europ~an

allies have permitted themselves to adapt

to the changing mood between East and West.

Not only docs France

withdraw all its forces from NATO--a measure I do not propose for
the U.S. to follow--but Canada reduces her military forces
substantially.

Other NATO nations have in recent years come far

shorter of target force levels to NATO than the U.S.;

in fact,

the U.S. has been the most falthful burden-sharer over the
history of the Alliance.
Schlesinger

Just two we eks ago, Secretary

stated that the U.S. is doing more than its fair share

~/

in Europe.

But still the U.S. cannot take the unilateral

action clearly called for in the Treaty--the unilateral action
heretofore clearly contemplated by all the Treaty partners.

Prior
~I
consultation would be ample, but the decision would be unilateral.
The time has come for the United states to realize that

tensions have eased between East and West--and that this relaxation

18/. House Foreign Affairs Hearings, July,

1973, 93rd Cong.,lst Sess.

19/. It was with disbelief that I read the newspaper reports of
President Nixon's recent visit with President Pompidou of France
in Iceland and the reports that President Pompidou told President

----19is a healthy and desirable change.
The time has come to set aside the rhetoric of the Cold war
used

to justify a status quo of military involvement around

the world.
The time has come to recognlze action that is long overdue,
and to prevent deferral of that action under a cloak of multinational negotiations that could take a decade or longer to
recommend less than what is justified today .
It is time now to respond to the spirit of detente, to the
success of the Marshall Plan and the current economic vitality of
Europe, to respond to the realities of the '70's, to respond more
fully to the needs of its own people at home.
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
So the absurdity of the U.S . -NATO posture for a long war ln
Europe is indicative of the staleness of thought that has
accompanied the American military position in the Atlantic Alli a nce .
While I have no intention of golng into detailed arguments

19/,cont'd. from page 18
Nixon that France would fight the removal of any U.S. troops from
Europe, even if done in the context of the so-called "MBFR."
Here is the President of one of the great countries of
Western Europe which removed all their troops from the NATO Command
in 1967 which has refused to participate in the mllitary aspects of
NATO since that time, which responded very early to the changed
circumstances of Europe--its political and economic health vis-a-vis
the East, telling the President of the Unlted States that France
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of a military character,

there are a few points which I believe

are directly relat1ve lo our consideration of the appropriate
levels of U. S . forces 1n Europe .

The main focus of lhese arguments

is the so-called "flexible response" theory.

This policy wus

advanced early in 1965 by the United States but it was only formally
adopted by NATO in 1967.

I certainly have no quarrel with any

policy which seeks to avoid automatic resort to nuclear war.

And

flexible response is a policy that should provide an expanded
pause period before nuclear weapons are resorted to on either side.
Unfortunately, however,

"flexible response" has been inter-

preted as a reason to prepare for a full-scale convent1onal war of
the World War II variety .

But 1s it aga1n a case of the words

replacing a thoughtful policy; of reducing the choices of NATO
to either an immediate nuclear war or a prolonged and exclusively
conventional war?

Both are extremely unlikely.

The "Economist", one of the more conservative Journals on
European affairs, wrote on September 16, 1972:

12J,

cont'd. from page 19.
would protest the removal of any American troops from the NATO
Command in Europe.
It is statements of this character that makes one wonder about
the viability of u.s. European policy on forces in Europe. "Washington Post," June l , 1973; June 28, 1973. See also Address by
Michel Jobert, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Before the
National Assembly, June 19, · 1973.

-21The heart of the matter is that most people believe
that the present allied forces in Western Europe, including
the present American contingent, would not be able to defend
themselves for more than a week w~thout using nuclear weapons
and perhaps for no more than two or three days.
Removal of
half the American contingent would probably reduce that to
a maximum of four days and a minimum of one unless the
Russians reduce their own army proport~onately or the
West Europeans are able to make up the difference.
So the

doctr~ne

of

flex~ble

respon! :e is most constructive in

extending the pause period hefore any confrontation in Europe
turns into a nuclear holoca'..lst.

As the "Economist" noted, a week

lS the maximum pause period that any European really feels the
NATO s t ructure could undertake.

This is basic realis:n.

It

~s

public knowledge that over 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons

]:!!./
that are in position in Western Europe
near the frontier.

some of them reported very

In view of this wide proliferation of nuclear

warheads in Europe and some so near the frontier,
me to

envis~on

it lS hard for

any serious conventional war scenario that doesn't

go nuclear in less than two days.

Our "tactical" nuclear weapons

will be either"captured" or "detonated."
The "hot line" was installed in Washington and Moscow to

20/. "The Mil~tary Balance 1972-1973," International Institute of
S t rategic Studies, London, England, pg. 90. See also Testlmony
J o~ nt Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcommittee on Military Appl~cations,
Apr~l 16, 1973, 93rd Cong.,
lst Sess.
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permit wise use of the pause period.

If a full-scale convent1onal

war is the NATO strategy--then all the nuclear weapons--whether
called tactical or strategic--should be removed far to the rear
where there might then remain the option of not using these
weapons.
It 1s a total incons1stency to have tactical nuclear weapons-some of them anchored into the ground near the frontier and to
be preparing for a sixty-ninety day

c~nventional

war of the World

War II variety in Europe.
But still it 1s our premise that the American forces must
be structured for a long war in Europe.

Supply and logistic

levels of American troops in Europe are for sixty-ninety days,
putting an added burden on manpower and supplies well beyond the
realm of reason .

£!..

w

"The NATO military objectives are deterrence and defence.
Yet NATO,and the Un1ted States in particular, mainta1n all-purpose,
offensive-oriented, expeditionary-style forces that do not provide
the desired deterrence because of their low initial combat capability
and their destabilizing tactical nuclear posture. A force structure
oriented for deterrence and defence can be bought at much less than
present cost--as Soviet forces in East Germany prove. Ad -justed
(equal front-line platoon strength , defined as infantry, tank ,
cavalry, and ant1-tank) peacetime division slices (the division itself
plus its share of non-divisional support personnel) total approximately 42,000 for American forces in West Germany; but only 18,500
for Soviet forces."
"The Wasteful Ways of NATO," Steven L. Canby,
Survival, Vol. XV,No.l, Jan-Feb, 1973, Institute Strategic Studies,
London, England.
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But even more

Sl

Jnificant 1s the Eu r opean react i on to any

removal of U. S. troops trom the Con tinent .

It i s an accepted

axiom that the Europeans v:ould f .ollow suit and r educe their
22./
conventional force~ as ~ell .
What 1s the lhreut , then , that r equires so many U. S. forces
on the Continent?

If there is a truly perceived t hreat of a

conventional war from the East , would not our European u l lics who
are closer to the "Lhreul" ther: respond by an accelerated commit ment of resou r ces?
detente

wand

But no,

they would relax as well , accept the

devote more resources to non - mllitary ventures .

Then

why should we , 3 , 000 m1les away, assume such arrogance as to
perceive a greaLer threat to Europe than do the Eu r opeans?
I think the question presumes a rati o nal answer but there is
none .

It does highlight , ho.vever ,

the dominance of the m1l1ta r y

posture in Europe by the United States . Since the formation
Supreme Allied
of NATO, there has never been a I
Commander who was not an
American.

U.S . perceptions of the

th~eat

are tolerated by the

Europeans and why not--the U . S . lS f oo ting the greatest share of
the cost .

Since 1t is really our nuclear response that the Eu r opeans

11J .

Testimony of Secretary Rush , House Foreign Affairs , Ju1y 10 , 1973 ,
93rd Congress , lst Sess .

221 .

Tes timony of Administration wi tnes s es , House Forei gn Affa i rs ,
July 10 , 11 , 12, 1973 , 93rd Congress , 1st Sess .

-24wish committed,

their tolerance for our eccentr1cities--including

the World war II conventi onal war contingency--i s very high.
Should the unlikely contingency of a mass movement by Warsaw
Pact forces take place,

it is inconceivable to me that the President

of the Un1ted States would not be in immed1ate contact wilh h1s
counterpart in the Soviet Union.
sistency upon incons1stency,

In any event, to p1le incon-

if the NATO military scenario cal ls

for a defense of a mass1ve move from the East,

that move must

necessarily come across the north German plains,
for a swift move because of the terrain.
attack the

u.s.

the likely area

For th1s convent1onal

forces are stationed in the wrong part of Germany .

The U.S. forces are positioned in central and southern Germany
within an enormous back-up capacity and with a consistently topheavy command structure wh1ch still has one flag officer fo r
roughly every 2,200 men.
It baffles me why a properly structured U.S. military force
of one or at the most two lean, mobile divisions, 1n position to
move rapidly aLong the German frontier, would not be even greater
insurance against any form of pressure from the East.
It would be more realistic to the type of improbable attack
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that might conceivably come from the East.
forces to be engaged from the
on the part of the Europeans
involved in the event of a

beginn~ng ,

thus allaying any fears

the United States would not be

th~t

qu~ck

It would permit American

thrust into Western Europe.

THE MBFR*
Again and again over the years we have been told both by our
own officials and those in Europe that some decrease in U.S.
24/
military presence should take place.
But the time is Dever right for such action.

Two years ago

the argument was the policy of Getente was underway and that
nothing should be done that would disrupt the process, including
the U.S.-USSR SALT negotiations and the goals envisioned by
Chancellor Brandt's "Ost_;_::>olitik."
Today we find ourselves in a new situation.

Success has been

achieved in the first and most important round of SALT talks;
the Warsaw and Moscow treaties have been concluded ; the status of
Berlin has been regularized; through the exchanges of visits between
President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev a new and better climate

24/ . Most recent statement of Secretary of Defense Schlesjnger
that the u . s. is doing more than its fair share in Europe. House
Foreign Affairs, July 1973, 93rd Congress, 1st Sess.
I use the familiar abbreviation, MBFR, throughout, even
though the more proper abbreviation since the preliminary talks
Final Communique of Preparatory Consultat~ons.
is MFR. see:

*

-26has been created which allows us to talk about the Cold War in
terms of the past.
Despite this movement, we are being told that this is the
"worst possible time" in which to take any action on the question
of our forces in Europe.

The bargaining chip is back.

Negotiations

on mutual force reductions are to begin on Octobe r 30th of this

]2/
year.
At the outset we were told by all the experts that MBFR
negotiations

w~ll

be even more complicated and lengthy than the

first phase of SALT.

Most informed and optimistic speculations

are that the outcome of such negotiations after perhaps two to three
years might be a reduction of no more than 10-15% on the part of
those countries involved.

w

]2/. The communique announcing the intention to meet on October
30th issued by the countries involved managed to lose the word
"balance." When the Senate last voted on a proposed amendment to
reduce U.S. forces in Europe, the distinguished Chairman of the
Armed Services Committee received a letter from President Nixon
stating h~ opposition to the amendment partly on the grounds that
"we expect that Mr. Brosio will be received in Moscow next week
to begin discussions on basic is sues of mutual and ba lanced force
reductions."
I do not myself doubt that this let ter from the President
naturally had great weight with our colleagues. But Mr. Brosio
never got to Moscow and preliminary discussions on MBFR did not
begin until this past January, 14 months after that letter.
26/. "Mutual and Balanced Force
Study, 73-36F, February 2 , 19 73 .

Reduct~ons,"

Library of Congress

-27Nothing has happened in the interim

s~nce

President Nixon's

letter of November 22, 1971, which has given us any different
picture of this argument.

Indeed, since the preliminary talks--

i.e., talks as to whether there should be talks--were expected
to take roughly five weeks and took about five months, my
skepticism has been increased rather than diminished about MBFR.
I

really doubt that the United States can remain immobilized on

the troops question for a minimum of two and possibly even four to
five years.

So the argument to wait for MBFR really is a post-

ponement of significant action indefinitely.
UNILATERAL ACTION
The questions of MBFR are immensely complicated even if they
were undertaken in a bilateral framework.

The

positioning of

forces, the proportionate reduction of one side as opposed to
the other because of different logistical requirements will
generate solutions equal to the number of participants at the
~/

conference.

So the complexity of MBFR

~s

magnified 19 times.

The wisdom of the North Atlantic Treaty which left the question
of specific troop commitments in the NATO command to be decided

£21.

There are 19 countries participating in MBFR.

See Appendix E.
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unilaterally by each country is abandoned ln MBFR.

Unilateral

action on such a matter lS the only practical method.

Any nation

entering into negotiations whether bilateral or multilateral only
agrees in those negotiations to what she determines unilaterally
she can do or must do in her own national interest.

No negotiation

with the Soviet Union would cause the Soviet Union to reduce any
of its troops from Eastern Europe if the Soviet Union determines
that those troops are needed in the Eastern European countries
for other than protectlon against an external threat.

In like

manner, if the Soviet Union senses a greater need for its troops
on other frontiers, or if she desires to divert a grea t er proportion of her resources to non-military interes t s, then t h e
appropriate reduct1ons by the USSR will be made--but only t hen.
So unilateral a c ti o n on our part to reduce U.S. troops
in Europe, while still maintaining our commi t men t with a more
wisely structured but significantly reduced level of troops
could very well stimulate a similar independently arrived at
response on the part of the Soviet Union.
in recent history.

This is not unprecedented

Unilateral and independent actions taken by

the United States and the Soviet Union for moratoriums on nuclear
tests in the atmosphere precipitated similar constructive independent
responses on each s1de which ultimately led to the nuclear test ban
treaty.

So the arguments that un1lateral action cannot lead to
constructive
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£§/
responses are unwarranted.
Unilateral action on the part of the Un1ted States might
produce surprising and constructive results.

What people fail

to realize is that the Soviet Union, ever since World War II, has
not only been acting, but reacting, within its military
ment.

establis~

Much of the Soviet force was created at a tinle when the

Unlted States had clear nuclear superiority.

Most informed

observers, here and in Western Europe, agree that the Soviet
Union is considerably more conservative and suspicious than the
United States because of its historical experiences and the
character of its society.

w

Yetno one seems willing to make allowances for the inertia
of this military conservatism in the USSR.

We forget that the

speeches by our NATO Commanders, as well as our political leaders,

28/. I only wish that the classic argument of doing things in
unison with the Soviet Union would be applied when it comes to
the stationing of u.s. forces on foreign soil. According to
figures published by the International Institute of Strategic
Studies, the Soviet Union has about 15,000 troops stationed outside of Soviet territory and Eastern Europe, whereas the United
States has about 300,000 military forces scattered around the
world, outside the U.S. and Europe. A parity with the Soviet
Union in this area would be a significant and constructive start
towards bringing America home again.
In its Eastern European satellites, USSR has stationed
330,000 USSR troops. See New York Times, July 20, 1973. The
total USSR troops outside of Soviet soil is therefore 345,000.
~/.

See Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (New York 1967).
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regarding need for NATO strength and readiness are read in quite
a different light by the Soviet leadership than we intend.

It seems

a simple proposition, that they trust us no more than we trust
them, but we do not seem to be able to absorb this view and
act upon it.
THE FINANCIAL BURDEN
Mr. Chairman, I have not dwelled upon the question of budgetary
drain and balance-of-payments costs of our troops stationed
overseas.

I have deliberately left this point to one sLde in con-

sidering these questions because I believe the UnLted States wLll
bear the necessary costs to fulfill its international obligations.
Our history will show that!

But I believe it is clear that the

UnLted States can fulfill its internatLonal obligations abroad
with a significant reduction of

u.s.

forces on f o reign soil.

I believe a focus on this Lssue can b e gained at last
because of the competition for resources at home.

But these

resources will be saved, not by trimming our sails on our international obligations but by trimming the waste from years of
inattention to a rational international policy.
This committee is well aware that the overall costs of our
commitment to NATO amounts to something in the neighborhood of

----------------

-31$17 bill1on,

includ1ng everyth1ng except strategic forces;

that

the direct annual operating costs for the approx1mately 300,000 U.S.
forces actually located in Europe amounts to approximately $4

lQI
b1llion;

u.s.

that the net balance of payments dra1n because of the

forces in Europe is approximately $1.5 b1ll1on annually; and that

these figures are growing da11y because of the Un1ted States'
disadvantage because of inflation, successive devaluations of the
dollar and other weakenings.
A return to rationality on the part of the Un1ted States and
its forces abroad would y1eld a very significant savings in
resources to the United States.

I have deliberately, Mr. Chairman,

not addressed myself to the issue of whether the troops that should
be removed from foreign soil should be demobilized.

It is my

opinion that a very sound international policy for the Un1ted States
could be 1mplemented with a reduction of 50% of the over 500,000
troops stationed on foreign soil.
The return of over 250,000 military personnel would reflect
the judgment that they were not needed to fulfill existing international and domestic obligations and therefore appropriate for
demob1lizat1on.

lQ/.

But I don't think that the quest1on of

Testimony of William J. Casey, Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 12, 1973,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess.

-32demobilization has to be directly addressed at th1s time s1nce I
believe the pressures of obtaining a military armed force without
the draft w1ll to a great extent resolve the issue of demobilization.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest a course of action
which I hope you will agree is most reasonable and desirable.
I believe it is a course that provides the appropriate civilian
guidance to our military leaders and gives them sufficient
lattitude in adjusting for themselves the specific reduction
which would stem from this proposal.
I believe that we should move in the direction of a 50%
reduction of our total forces stationed in all overseas
territories.

I believe this reduction should be accomplished

within a three-year period and in a carefully structured way
which would not necessarily entail the same percentage reduction
in each of the three years or in any one area of the world, but would
provide that not less than 25% of the total envisioned cut would
take place in each of the three years.

I prefer to do this

on a worldwide basis because I believe the United States is
overextended precisely on that basis.
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Secondly, I would suggest confining the cuts to land-based
units in order to permit our fleets to operate at appropriate
strengths, but at the same

t~me

not excluding home ported naval

units from the overall computation.
Finally, I am proposing to leave as much discretion to our
military commanders as is commensurate with our foreign policy
interests.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, the wasteful expression of our external
power--expression well beyond any reasonable need--has begun to
erode our internal freedom.

The disclosures of recent months

might very well be interpreted in part as the methodology of the
American Empire returning home to undermine the fibre of our
republic.

w

I believe we have talked, debated and quarreled long enough
about

th~s

whole problem of U.S. foreign policy as it is

implemented abroad.

The time for

act~on

is long overdue and action

is what I hope this Committee will recommend.

~ee

111.

David P. Calleo, The Atlantic Fantasy (Johns Hopkins Press 1970)
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much-improved East-West situation. But

in View of our improved relations with

U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, this
morning the Subcommittee on Arms Con-

trol, International Law and Organization of the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on "Mutual Force Reductions in Europe." We were particularly fortunate to have with us two witnesses who have had a great deal of experience with and a long-standing interest in the issue of U.S. troops levels in
Europe-the distinguished majority
leader, MIKE MANSJ'IELD, and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush.
'
Mr. President, for three decades, the
United States ha&.- been intimately involved with the political integrity and
the military security· of Western Europe.
In the emerging. post-Vietnam era, one
of the most important elements in our
foreign po11cy will be our political, economic, and military relations with our
European allies.
A key· issue in those relations is the
u.s. milltary commitment to Europe. At
present, we have more than 300,000
troops and 250,000 dependents stationed
on the other side of the Atlantic. This
represents the largest overseas deployment of American forces today. In all, we
have nine active divisions earmarked for
duty in the NATO theater as well as 40
Air Force Squadrons and the 6th
Fleet-to say nothing of many other elements of our overall strategic nuclear deterrent deployed at home and abroad.
The cost of maintaining American forces
in Europe, together with those in the
United States that have NATO missions,
has steadily climbed from $12 billion in
fiscal 1971 to an estimated $17.7 billion
in fiscal 1973. The balance-of-payments
deficit resulting from milltary accounts
in Europe is estimated at more than $1.5
b11lion for fiscal1973.
A number of events have recently oe·curred which have significantly altered
the European political and economic
landscape-the Moscow and Washington
summit meetings and growing East-West
detente; the SALT I Agreement; the
Berlin Accords; the preliminary negotiations on European Security and on Mutial and Balanced Force Reductions; the
entry or' Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark into the Common Market; and two
successive devaluations of the dollar, to
name just a few. Despite these changes,
the Defense Department has indicated
in its milltary manpower report for fiscal
1974 its interest in maintaining the same
military commitment in Europe that we
had this past year.
Few doubt the need for a strong, credible NATO. Few doubt that the military
strength of the Alliance has played an
important role in bringing about the

the SoViets, in View of our own economic
problems, and in view of the failure of
the now-prosperous Europeans to assume
a significantly larger share of the NATO
burden, a number of questions have been
raised about our present policies which
this subcommittee intends to examine:
the rationale for the continued maintenance of oU!' present force levels in
Europe; the magnitude of the expenditures-and resulting balance of pp.yments
deficit-to maintain these forces; and
the prospects for reducing American
forces in Europe on a mutual basis at
this time.
The administration has taken the
position that this country would be unwise to reduce unilaterally our military
commitment in Europe, even by a token
number. The administration has argued
that there is nothing "immutable" about
the exact number of men we have stationed in Europe, but that any unilateral
reduction of U.S. forces in Europe would
start "the process of unraveling the
peacetime defen.Se of the West" and
"cripple" future efforts to negotiate mutual cutbacks with Warsaw Pact nations.
Nearly 2 years ago, I stated my own
view in a Senate speech that "mutual
force reductions in Europe represent one
of the most critical and important arms
control possibilities in the near future."
I urged the a.dmln1stration "to move
forthrightly" toward this goal. I continue
to support efforts on the part of our
Government to negotiate a mutual reduction of forces in Europe. And I look
forward with great hope to the NATOWarsaw Pact negotiations on Mutual
Force Reductions in Europe which are
scheduled to begin in Vienna on October 30 of this year.
On the other hand, we should all remember that the preliminary Mutual and
Balanced Force Reductions sessions,
begun in January 1973, took 5 months
instead of the planned 5 weeks; and that
the upcoming so-called Mutual Forces
Reduction talks will take 1 to 2 years at
a minimum, by the administration's own
estimates. In the short-run, we must concern ourselves with very real economic,
military and political problems which
might not easily be filed away while our
diplomats negotiate.
U.S. forces have been stationed in
Western Europe in large numbers since
Congress acted in 1951 to bolster our
ground forces there by four divisions in
the belief that hostilities in Korea might
lead to a sharply increased Soviet threat
to the nations of Western Europe. Since
1951 the number of milltary personnel
stati~ned in Europe has been determined
by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council. This is not as it should be.
Congress has the constitutional responsibility to review and reshape our force
levels and our overseas deployment when
necessary. I hope that the hearings which
began this morning in my subcommittee
will be tn important step in giving Congress the information and understanding
necessary to carry out its constitutional
duty with respect to our security needs
in Europe.
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Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- ·
cent that the testimony given this morn ing by Senator MANSFIELD and Deputy
Secretary R\ISh be printed in the RECORD
at this point.
There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the
RECOJ\P, as follows:
STI\TJ:MEN-r ~ SlrNATOR Mnc.: MANSriiiLD Bl:r o RE THE SOBCONINITTI<£ ON ARMS CONTROL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW ANO 0RGANIZATIONII,
JULY

lli, 1973

Mr. Cha1nnan, I want to begin by thankIng you tor the invitation to address this
committee on t h e question o! U .S. forces in
Europe--as well aa on the broader context
in which we must place our consideration.
the question o! U .S. military forces arou,nd
the world.
The United States currently has stat ioned
on foreign soil over 600,000 military personnel.' In addition, over 100,000 military personnel are. a.doat off !ol:etgn shores.• AlmO<Jt
30 % ot our muttary forces are stationed
beyond our homeland. Not since the days of
the British Empire or probably more truly,
the RomAn Empire, have so many been required to "maintain the peace" away !rom
their shores. •
I believe lt Is Important to view the queettoon in the broad context of U.S. 1oroes stationed around the world. It has been palnfully evident and generally agreed in the
United States Senate for at least the last
several years that the Untted States Is badly
over-extended abroad.
We must not forget the lesson of the tragic
war in VIetnam; for that tragedy will only
be compounded 1! we refuse to learn and
gu1c1e our actlona accordingly.
The National Commitments Resolution
pa.ed. overwhelml.ngly by the Senate was
slgnl.11cant evidence of the prevailing sentiment In the Senate.• The War Powers legislation pM8ed overwhelmingly by both Houses
of Con~rr~~sa Is another slgnltlcant step.•
But tbeee vital actions reform and retlne
our Institutional mechanisms. They serve
notice of the Oongre881onal threShold of tolerance. They demonstrate a Congre881onal
attitude that -Ita a greater share of responslblllty. But these constructive changes
are not enough. We must accept the realization that our commitments and polic ies are
not always made in formal and tradition al
ways. In fact, some pollcles seem to "Just
happen."
The presence of so many U .S . forces on
foreign aoU' Is such a policy. Their presence
presumes a pollcy that heavUy favors the
military option. The War Powers legislation
expre-s Congre88lonal di8811nt to that
emphasis. But the fundamental dlfflcultll in
duoernlng aemblance to America'~ polfcll
abroad u that the commitment and level of
U.S. forces abroculluu determined our polfcll
rather than ovr polfcll determtnlng the level
of U .S. forcea abroad. The lntract&bUity of

executive branch attitude on force levels
abroa,l durlng the past 25 years can only be
explained by the incapacity o! the policymakers to perceive that the troops on foreign
soU was our policy and p olicy-makers were
really articulating after-the- fact rationalizations. Members of the Executive Branch ,
whether In oftl.ce !or two weelta, two months,
two years or two decades, have had the &a m e
theme, and It 111 always one that the world
will fall 1! any of our soldiers return h ome.
But yearning to return home shall becom e
more compelling with each passing m onth.
The Impoundment by this Administration of
e12 billion for domestic needs; the cloelng of
many U.S. military bases as an economy
measure, putting many Americans out of
work; the devaluation of the dollar by more
than 25% over t he past two years; all wlll
Join In marshalling attention to wh lllt heretoPootnotee at end of artJcle.

fore has been considered an issue that should
be let.t to the "experts." I believe the arguments this year will be beard.
As I stated above, the plain fact ls that the
U nited States s t ations over 600,000 military
f orces ou tside the United States and Ita territor ies and possessions. We maintain over
2 000 bases and Installations on foreign soli.•
There are over 314,000 dependents stationed
o verseas accompanying these forces .• The
Defense Depart ment employs directly or Indir ectly a pproximately 173,000 foreign nationals
at these bases overseas to support these U.S.
f orces abroad.' These are not reasons !or
bringing our troops home, but they are facts
that should make America listen to the
r easons.
The most detailed focus can be obtained on
Europe. At least In 1950 the Congre88 was
asked to participate In that decision of sendIng troops to tba.t Continent. But equally
for ceful questions can be raised as well to
the U.S. troop co=ltmenta in Thailandn ow about 45,000; or in Oklnawa, about
40,000; or Korea, about 42,000; or Taiwan,
about 8,000; or the PhUipplnes, about 15,000;
or Japan, about 18,000; o r even Bermuda
where a bout 1,000 men defend our national
Interests.•
Let us look at Europe where NATO was
tlrs t structured. Let us look at the realities
t hat f aced this Nation at that time which
precip itated the commitment of !our divisions to Europe. Let us look a.t the premises
upon which the Congress &8811nted to this
commitment of these divisions and the representations tba.t were made at that tlme
about the permanence of such a oo=ltment
of manpower abroad. Then let us look at
Europe and the U.S. today, 28 years after
the War, 23 ye&cs after the Initial stationing
of these divisions to NATO.
ll:tla<>PS AFTI:Jl WORLD WAll

n

World War l l left Western Europe In ruins.
The gener al view In the West was that the
oommunlst monollst under Stalin had the
domin atio n of the entire planet as Its goal.
The United States moved swiftly with the
most maaslve reconstruction effort ever a.ttempted with Ita Marshall Plan-an effort
t hat b as proven succe88ful beyond expectations. The Institutions of Europe, political,
econom ic as well as military, were In
shambles. With theee weakened conditions In
Europe combined wltb the co=on percept ion of the threat of the hordes from the
East • a strong mUitary presence In Western Europe to compliment the economic effort
was rational. But the North Atlantic Treaty
Itself did not commit U.S. troops to the Europe an continent for deterrence. In !act, the
trea ty Itself made no commitment or U.S.
ground troops to Europe. It was not until
1951 t hat the decision was made to send four
land divisions to Europe and Congre88lonal
assent solicited to this significant commitment of troops.
The h istory of proceedings before the Oongresa are very revealing.
Secretary Marshall claimed at that time
that there was nothing magical about four
d ivisions. The full level was selected based
u pon a judgment of our resources and their
avallabWty. It only the same standard were
to be a p plied today. And why should It not be
applied ? ••
But even more revealing Is the exchange
that Senator Hlckentooper had with Secretary Acheson· when It was made clear by Secretary Acheson that the original NATO
Treaty envisioned no troops stationed In Europe by the United States and that It was
clear that each signatory to the NATO Treaty
would unilaterally make Ita own determination of Ita contribution of military equipment, manpower .and facUitles.u In addition,
Secretary Acheson envisioned the return of
t roops su bsequently sent 1! the sltua.tlon got
better.
·
But wha t conditions were envisioned in
1951 that Initiall y warranted the troops to go
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to Europe and what thorny questions should
be resolved for us to expect their return.

Senator Smith of New Jersey sought this information !rom General Bradley In 1951 .an d
General Bradley felt the making of a peace
treaty wltb Germany and the state of p reparedness of the other n ations of Europ e .as
well as the aggressive Intentions of the East
were the chief Irritants that justified U.S.
action."
These were all valid concerns In 1951. In
addition, It was & time when the Korea n War
was underway; China was a n active enemy;
the Soviets bad come of nuclear age; the
South East European tlank was still threat ened; the economies of Western ]j;urope were
just back on their feet; political lnstabUity
was prevalent in most West European countries. Strong men replaced strong institutions
and provided the cohesion for Western Europe. But even then the questions were
raised : Should the U.S. commit four d ivisions
to Europe as a deterrent to a nother European
Will at least untU Eur ope Is ready to assu me
Ita own defenses.
The Congr ess assented to that requ est and
the American t roops returned to Europe to
meet the threa t tha t was per ceived at that
tlme. However real the threat t hen , b as lt
changed since that t lme?
EUllOPE SINCE THE ' 5 0'S

Whe11- U.S. troops were Initially committed
to the European continent, total GNP of all
European NATO countries was $46.9 bUllon
compared to e831.9 b illion for 1972.11 The era
of confrontation was h igh a n d the nat ional
institutions were weak. Interrelat ionships
were virtually non- existent. Let us look at
and contrast. the economic e xcha nge:
(In millions)
1951
197Z
U.S. Imports from U.S.S.R . . e 27. 4
• 9 5. 6
U.S. exports to U.S.S.R....
0.1
546. 7
U .S. Imports from Eastern
320. 1
Europe-- --- -- ---------- 63.8
U .8. exports to E&atern
818. 2
Europe ---------- - - - -2. 8
The total exports from all NATO countries to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe In
1972 amounted to e9.89 billi~. The Impo r ts
from the U.S.S.R. and Easte'rn Europe to
NATO countries totaled e8.67 bllllon." In t hls
one .area alone of trade between the blocs, the
most dramatic change in climate must be
recognized.
But even more signl.11cant than evaluating
not only the strength of Western Europe and
appreciating the strong trade tlow between
East and West ls the great number of events
since 1963 that manttest as well as significantly contribute to the lessening of tensions .between East and West. I have selected
eighty-two events [ consider significant since
1963.•• They range !rom the hot line to the
Nuclear Test Ban to the Consular Conven tion
to the Non-proliferation Treaty to the treaty
normalizing relations between Germany and
Poland; to the Soviet-West German a greement on consulates; to the German treaties
with Sov!et Unton; to the SALT treaty; to
the signing of the treaty on relations between East and West Germany. But to m a ny
the threat of an all-out conventional war
with the hordes from the East remains the
same. Rigidity. affects not on ly the rhetor ic
but the policy. General Eisenhower testifyIng in 1951 about Congre88lonal responsibility ln the determination and the evolution of
the level of U.S. troops in Europe said:
"I do tlllnk that Congress ought to see a
respectable, reasonable approach, and the
second they see anything to be, let's say,
cockeyed and crazy, to get into the t hing
with both feet.""
Well, Mr. Chairman , I think the tlme has
come when Congress must recognize that in
the words of Gen e r al Eisenhower, eomet hing
Is cockeyed abou t U.S. troops s tationed
abroad. Presid en t Eisenhower later recog-
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nlzed that change WM justified. He stated In
1963 that one U.S. division would be sumclent to tulOil our commitment to NATO."
l t ls evident from these lndlcla or engagement with the Soviet Union and Eastern
Euro!>@ thr.t the tension that existed In the
~arly ':iO's hns changed significantly. Further
movement bas been proposed between Bast
r.nd West. As ~•!dent NIXon stated to a
J o mt Session of the Congress on June 1, 1972:
"By forming habits of cooperation and
strengthening Institutional ties In areas of
peaceful enterprise, the.se four agreements
(Moscow summit, May 1972) to which I have
referred wlll create on both sides a steadily
growing vested Interest In the maintenance
of good relations between our two countries.
"Expanded United States-Soviet trade Will
also yield advantages to both or our nations.
When the two largest economies In the world
start trading with each other on a much
larger scale, living standards In both nations
wlll rise and the stake which both have In
peace wlll inCrease."
It Is time that the U.S. recognized the exIstence or Its own polfcy toward the East. The
pollcy of this government should be consistent, not one of engagement with the Soviet
Union In trade and cultural exchange and
confrontation In military matters. There
should be but one barometer by which this
government guides Its actions toward the

n.EXIIILJI: RII:BPONSIC

So the absurdity of the U.S.-NATO poeture
tor a long war In Europe Ia Indicative of the
staleness of thought that has aocompanled
the American military poeltion In the Atlantic Alliance.
Whlle I have no Intention of going Into
detailed arguments of a mllltary character,
there are a !ew points which I believe are
dlrectly relative to our consideration of the
appropriate levels or U.S. forces In Europe.
The main focus .of these arguments 1s the
so-<l6Jied ".flexible response" theory. This
policy was advanced early In 1965 by the
United States b~t It was only !orma11y
adopted by NATO In 1967. I certainly ha.ve
no quarrel With any policy Which seeks to
avoid automatic resort to nuclear war. And
:flexible response Is a policy that should provide an expanded pause period before nuclear
weapons are resorted to on either side.
Unfortunately, however, "flexible response"
has been Interpreted as a reason to prepare
for a full-scale conventional war of the
World War II variety. But Is It again a case
of the words replacing a thoughtful pollen
or reducing tbe choices or NATO to either an
Immediate nuclear war or a prolonged and
exclusively conventional war? Both are extremely unll~ely.
The "Eoonomlat", one of the more conservative journals on European affairs, wrote
on September 18, 1972:
Eaat.
"The heart or the matter Ia that most
But we have many barometers that provide people believe that the present allied forces
such dltl'erent readings for the ssme phenom- In Western Europe, Including the present
enon. This dual standard !or ratlonallzlng American contingent, would not be able to
our polloles vill-a-vis the Eastern bloc cannot defend themselves for more than a week
withstand thoughtful focus. I! our policy Without using nuclear weapons and perhaps
toward the East Is predicated upon a desire for no more than two or three days. Removal
to open markets and develop a mutua! Inter- of half the American contingent would probdependency or Eaet and West upon each ably reduce that to a maximum of four days
other, that poUcy Will yield benefits beyond and a minimum of one unless the Russians
the economic sphere as they have with In- reduce their own army proportionately or
creased cultural and educational exchanges. the West Europeans are able to make up
It Ia a natural evolution or the events of the the dl1ference."
past decade. But In the military spher-.tn
So the doctrine of :flexible response Ia most
~e NATO structure-what remains Is a stale
oonstruotlve In extending the pause period
rigidity; a resort to old rationalizations !rom before any confrontation In Europe turns
bygone years.
'
Into a nuclear holocaust. As the "Economist"
But the double standard Is not new, even noted, a week !.a the maximum pause period
Within our own Alliance. Our European allies that any European really reels the NATO
have permitted themselves to adapt to the structure could undertake. This Is basic
changing mood between East and West. Not realism. It Is public knowledge that over 7,000
oniy does Prance Withdraw all Its forces !rom tactical nuclear weapons that are In poeltlon
NATO-a measure I do not propose !or the In Western Europe"' some of them reported
U.S. to follow-but Canada reduces her mili- very near the frontier. In view ot this wide
tary forces substantially. Other NATO na- proliferation of nuclear warheads In Europe
tions have In recent years come fa.r shorter and some so near the frontier, It Is hard for
of ta.rget force levels to NATO than the U.S.; me to envlalon any serious conventional war
In fact, the U.S. has been the most faithful scenario that doesn't gc nuclear In less than
burden-sbe.rer over the history of the Alli- two days. Our "tactlca1" nuclear weapons will
ance. Just two weeks ago, Secretary Schle- be either "captured" or "detonated."
singer stated that the U.S. Is doing more than
The "hot llne" wae Installed In WashingIts fair Share In Europe.u But still the t:" .S. ton and Moecow to permit wise use of the
cannot take the unilateral action clearly pause period. If a full-scale conventional war
called for In the Treaty-the unilateral ac- Is the NATO strategy-then all the nuclear
tion heretofore clearly contemplated by all weapons--whether called tactical or strathe Treaty partners. Prior consultation would tegic--should be removed far to the rear
be ample, but the decision would be unilatwhere there might then remain the option
eral.'"
of not using these weapons.
The time has come for the United States
It Is a total Inconsistency to have tactical
to realize that tensions have eased between nuclear weapoll&-6oD'Ie of them anchored
J!lMt and West-and that this relaxation Is Into the ground near the frontier and to be
a healthy and desirable obange.
preparing for a siXty-ninety day convenThe time has come to set aside the rhetoric tional war of the World War II variety In
ot the Oold War used to justify a status quo Europe.
of mUltary Involvement around the world.
But still It Is our premise that the AmeriThe time has come to recognize action can forces must be structured for a long war
that Is long overdue, and to prevent deferral In Europe. Supply and logistic levels of Amerof that action under a cloak o! multinational Ican troops In Europe are for sixty-ninety
negotiations that could take a decade or days, putting an added burden on manpower
longer to recommend less than what Is just1- and supplies well beyond the realm of reason.2l
.
11ed today.
It Is time now to respond to the spirit ot
But even more significant Is the European
detente, to the success of the Marshall Plan . reaction to any removal of u:s. troops from
and the current economic vitality of Europe, the Continent. It Is an accepted axiom that
to respond to the realities or the '70's, to the Europeans would follow suit and reduce
respond m~ fully to the needs of Ita own their conventional forces as wen.•
people at home.
What Ia the threat, then, that requires so
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many U.S. forces on the Continent? If there
Is a truly perceived tl)reat ot a oonventlonal
wa.r from the East, would not our European
allies who are clooer to the "threat" then respond by an accelerated commitment ot resources? But no, they would relax as well.
accept the detente a and devote more resources to non-military ventures. Then why
should we, 3,000 miles away, assume such
arrogance as to perceive a greater threat to
Europe than do the Europeans?
I think the question presumes a rational
answer but there Is none. It does highlight,
however, the dominance of the military posture In Europe by the United States. Since
the !ormation of NATO, there has never been
a Supreme Allied Comma.nder who was not an
Amerlcan.'·U.S. perceptions or the threat are
tolerated by the Europeans and why notthe u.s. Is tooting the greatest share of the
cost. Since It Is really our nuclear response
that the Europeans wish committed, their
tolerance for our eccentricities--Including
the World War II conventional war contingency-Is very hlgb.
Should the unlikely contingency of a mass
movement by Warsaw Pact forces take place,
It Is Inconceivable to me that the President
of the United States would not be In Immediate contact with his counterpart In the Soviet Union. In any event, to pile Inconsistency upon Inconsistency, If the NATO military scenario calls for a defense of a massive
move from the East, that move must necessarily come I\Cl"'88 the north German plains,
the likely area for a swift move because o!
the terrain. For this conventional attack the
U.S. forces are stationed In ~he wrong part or
Germany. The U.S. forces are positioned In
central and southern Germany within an
enormous back-up capacity and with a consistently top-heavy cornma.nd structure
wblch still has one tJag olllcer for roughly
every 2,200 men.
It bal!les me why a properly structured U.S.
military force ot one or at the most two lean,
mobile dlvls1ons, In position to move rapidly
along the German frontier, would not be even
greater lnsura.nce against any !ann of pressure from the ~t.
It would be more realistic to the type of
Improbable attack that might conceivably
come from the East. It would permit American forces to be engaged from the beginning,
thus allaying any !861'11 on he part of the
Europeans that the United Statee would not
be Involved In the event ot a quick •thrust
Into Westem Europe.
TID: MlD'II*

Again and again over the years we have
been told both by our own omclals and thooe
In Europe that some decrease In U.S. mllttary
presence should take place."'
But the time is never right for such action.
Two years ago the argument was the policy
of detente was underway and that nothing
should be done that would dlarupt the process, Including the U.S.-USSR SALT negotiations and the goals envlaloned by Chancellor Brandt's "Ostpolitik."
Today we find ourselves In a new situation.
Success has been achieved In the first and
most Important round of SALT talks; the
Warsaw and Moscow treaties have been concluded; the status of Berlin has been regularIzed; through the exchanges of visits between
President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev
a new and better climate has been created
which allOWB us to talk about the Cold War
In terms of the past.
Despite this movement, we are being told
that this Is the "worst possible time" In
which to take any action on the question
ot our forces In Europe. The bargaining chip
is back'. Negotiations on mutual force reductions are to begin on October 30th of thls
year.•
At the outset we were told by all the experts that MBFR negotiations will be even
more complicated and lengthy than the firs t
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phase of SALT. Most in!ormed and optmistic
speculations are. that the oU'tcome of such
negotiations after perhaps two to three years
might be a reduction of no more than 10-16% on the part of those countries involved."'
Nothing hBB happened in the interim since
President Nixon's letter of November 22,
1971, which has given us any different picture
of this argument. Indeed, since the prellmlne.ry talks-i.e., talks e.s to whether there
should be tallts--were expected to take
roughly five weeks and took about llve
months, my skepticism has been Increased
rather than dlmlnlshed about MBPR. I really
d{)ubt that the United Statee can remaln 1mmobilized on the troops question for a mintmum or two and possibly even four to five
years. So the argument to walt for MBl"R
really Is a postponement of significant action
tnde!lnttely.
UNILATERAL ACTION
The questions of MBl"R are immensely
compllcated even 1! they were undertaken in
a bilateral framework. The positioning o!
forces, the proportionate reduction of one
side as opposed to the other because of d1!!erent loglstlcaJ requirements will generate
solutions equal to the number of participants
at the conference. So the complexity o!
MBF'R Is magnified 19 tlme<s.27
The wtsdom of the North Atlantic Treaty
which left the question of speclflc troop
commitments In the NATO comxnand to be
decided unlle.terally by each country Is e.bandoned in MBFR. Unilateral e.ctlon on such
a matter Is the only practical method. Any
nation entering into negotiations whetl'er
bilateral or multilateral only agrees in those
negotle.tlons to what she determines unilaterally she can do or must do In her own
national interest. No negotte.tlon wtth the
Soviet Union would cause the Soviet Union
to reduce any or ita troops from Eastern Europe 11 the Soviet Union determines that
those troops are needed In the Eastern European countries for other than protection
against an external threat. In llke manner,
1f the Soviet Union senses a greater need for
Ita troope on other frontiers, or 1! she desires
to divert a greater proportion o( her resources
to non-military Interests, then the appropriate reductions by the USSR wUI be madebut only then.
So unilateral action on our part to reduce
U.S. troops In Europe, whUe stU! malntatnlng our commitment with e. more wtsely
structured but significantly reduced level
of troops could very well stimulate a si.J:i:lllar
Independently arrived at response on the
part o! the Soviet Union. This Is not unprecedented In recent history. Unilateral and
Independent actions taken by the United
States e.nd the Soviet Union for moratoriums
on nuclear tests In the atmosphere precipitated eimUe.r constructive Independent
reeponsee on each side which ultimately led
to the nuclear test ban treaty. So the a.rguments that unilateral action cannoot lead to
constructive responses e.re unwarranted.•
Unilateral action on the part of the United
States Inight produce surprising and constructive results. What people fall to realize
Is that the Soviet Union, ever since World
War II, has not only been acting, but reactIng, wtthln Its military establishment. Much
of the Soviet fOrce was created at a time
when the United StateS' bad clear nuclee.r
superiority. Most Informed obeervers, here
and In Wet;tern Europe, agree that the Soviet
Union Is considerably more conservative and
suspicious than the United States because
of its historical experiences and the character of Its society."'
Yet no one see~ru~ willing to make allowances for the Inertia of this mUI~y conservatism In the USSR. We forget that the
speeches by our NATO Commanders, as well
as our polltlcal leaders, regarding need for
NATO strength and readiness a.re read in
q u1te a 41fferent light by tbe Sovlet leadership than we Intend. It seems a simple prop-

osition, the.t they t ru.et us ..no more than
we trust them, but we do nat seem to be able
to absorb this view and aot up¢n lt.
Tim FINANCIAL BUBDJ:N

Mr. Chairman. I have not dwelled upon the
question o! budgetary drain and balance-Ofpayments costs or our troops stationed overseas. I have deliberately left this point to
one side in considering these questions because I believe the United States wlll bear
the necessary costs to fulfill Its international
obligations. Our history wlll show that I But
I believe It Is clear that the United States
can fulfill tts International obligations
abroad wtth a significant reduction o! U.S.
forces on foreign soU.
I believe a focus on this Issue can be gained at last because of the competition for resources a.t home. But these resouroes wUI be
saved, hot by trlminlng our salls on our
lntema.tlonal obligations but by trimming
the waste !rom years or inattention to a
rational International policy.
This Committee Is well aware that the
overall costs of o ur cominitment to NATO
amounts to somet hing In the neighborhood
of $17 billion, Including everything except
strategic forces; that the direct annual
operating costs for the approxlmately 300,000 U.S. f orces actually located In Europe
amounts to approximately $4' bUllon;oo that
the net balance of payments draJn because
or the U.S. forces In Europe Is approximately
$1.6 billion annually; and that tbeee figures
are growing dally because of tbe United
States' disadvantage because of ln1l&t1on,
successive devaluations of the dollar and
other weakenlngs.
A return to r~>.tlonallty on the part of the
United St ates and Its forces abroe.d would
yield a very slgnlflcant savings in resources
to the United States. I bave deliberately,
Mr. Chalrman, not ~>.ddreseed myself to the
Issue of whether the troops t hat should be
removed from foreign soU should be demobilized. It Is my opinion that a very sound
International policy for the United States
could be Implemented with a reduction of
110 % of the over 600,000 troops s t ationed on
foreign soU.
Tbe return of over 250,000 mUit ary personnel would ·reflect the JUdgment that t hey
were not needed to fulfill existing International and domestic obligations and therefore appropriate for demobilizat ion. But I
don't t hink t hat t he quest ion of demobUizatlon has to be d irectly addressed a.t t his time
since I beUeve t he pressures of obtaining a
military armed force without the draft w111
to a. great extent resolve the Issue of demobilIzation.
CON CLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest a

course of aotlon which I h ope you wlll agree
Is most reasonable a n d desirable. I beUeve It
Is a course that provides the approprte.te
civilian guidance to our Inllltary leaders and
gives them sumclent !attitude in adJustiD.g
for themselves the specific redu ction wblcb
would stem !rom this proposal.
I beUeve that we should move In the direction of a 50 % red uctlon or our tot al forces
stationed in all overseas territories. I believe
tbte reductton should be accompltsbecl wltbln
a three-year period a.nd In a carefully structured way which would not necessarily ent aU
the same pe rcentage reduction In each of t he
three years or In any one area of tbe world,
but would provide that not less than 26 %
of tbe total envisioned cut would t ake place
in each of t he three years. I prefer to do this
on a worldwide baste because I beUeve the
United States Is overextended preciSely on
that basis.
Sej:ondly, I would suggest confining the
cuts to land-ba.sed units In order to permit
our fieets to operate at approprle.te s trengths,
but at the saq1e time not excluding bome
ported naval units from the overall computation.
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'Finally, I am proposing to leave as much
discretion to our mUitary commanders as 1B
commensurate with our foreign policy Interests.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, the wasteful expression of our external power-expression well
beyond any reasonable need~as begun to
erode our Internal freedom. The disclosures
of recent months n:.lght very well be interpreted in part as the methodology of the
American Empire returning borne to undermine the fibre of our republtc.Bl
I believe we have talked, debated and quarreled long enough about tbls whole problem
of U.S. foreign poUcy as It Is implemented
abroad. The time for action Is long overdue
and action Is what I hope this Committee
w111 recommend.
FOOTNOTES
' See Appendix A.
•Ibid.
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"' Senator On.LE'I'TJ!!. Just one additional
question. There Is no magic formula in the
four plus two divisions, as I understand It?
Secretary MAIIBHALL. It ts just a combination of considerations that we have bad to
turn over In our minds.
Senator On.Lrrls. Taking into consideration a number or factors, the Immediate
avallabUity of troops and the fact that we
want to make, In our opinion, a move, take a
course that will give some reassurance to our
allies that we are taking Into consideration
our resources and tbelr avallabl!lty, the rocmula of four plus t wo was reached?
Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, Sir.
Senatol' GILLETTE. And there Is nothing
magic about It?
Secretary MARSHALL. No, certainly not . . .
Hearings on "Assignment of Ground Forces
of t he United States to Duty in European
Area ," February, 1951, Commit tee on Foreign
Relat ions and Commit tee on Armed Services,
U.S . Senate, 82nd Con gress, 1st SessiOn.
lJ Senator HrcKENLOOPER . .. . I do say t o
you t hat wttbout any d oubt In my Inind, the
North Atlantic Pact proposition was sold to
a great many Members o! t he Congress on
the Idea t hat prior to aggression we would
not be called upon to implement tbe land
arinies of Westem Europe by large n umbers
of troops .. .
Now, may I ask you, bas the policy
changed, or Is t bts a new proposit ion? Has
your posit ion changed? Apparently It bas, but
I would like to have you comment on lt.
Secretary ACHESON. I shall be glad to comm ent on what you have Just stated.
The question which you asked me was understood by me e.s It bas Just been understood by Senator Smith, a.nd tha t was whether, under art icle 3 of the treaty, we were expected, In t he sense of were we undertaking
a commitment, to send ground troops to Europe. I replied to you that the answer to t hat
'Is a clear and absolute "no." We were n ot
undertaking a commitment b y article 3 of
that treaty to do anytlng except t o work wit h
our all1es to establish Individual and collective defense.
I think It was clearly understood that way
by the committee, which you wtll remember,
and I should like to recall to you that that
committee, In Its report, said, under tbts
article 3 :
"Realistic assessment of the defensive ca.-
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paclty necessary to resist armed attack will
be a function o! the organlza.tlon to be established under actlcle 9."
And It goes on:
"On the ba.sls of this assessment, each
party would determine for Itself what It
could most e!l'ectively contribute In the form
of facilities, mJllt&ry equipment. production
cnpa.clty , m&npO"{er. etc. This decision would
be tak~n In Wle )lght o! the resources and
!(Cogra.phlca.1 Jocntlon of the Individual state,
nnd with due regard to Its economic stability.
There 1s no specUlc obligation as to the timIng, nature, .and extent of assistance to be
given by any par<y ."
That Is exactly In accordance with my
understanding then nnd now, and that was
what I thought wns being asked, and to
that I was respondJng.
Senator HlCKENLOOPER. I am trying to !lnd
out whether this is only the camel getting its
head under the tent, and whE:ther the 4 divisions will require 6 more and then the 10
will require 12 more, and where we are going,
wh&t we b&ve to look forward to? In view of
the fact that we dJd not contemplate sendJng
any substantial numbers of ground troops to
tmp1emeni the North Atlantic Treaty, and
now the scenes have shifted and we are being
edged In, not by the back door but by the
front <1oor, with divisions of troops which
at least I did not contemplate we were going
to send or Intendedto send, I am wondering
where the end of this matter Is. In the long
run will we be put Into the Inevitable position ot a.ssumJng the primary responstbll1ty
tor the land defense of Europe. I am concerned a.s to whether or not we are gong to get
ouraelves In that position by this piecemeal
attrition method, or whether our commitmenta an land forces at the moment meet
our reasonable obligations under the defense
program a.s It Is now contemplated.
Seol'et&ry AcJmSoN. Senator, I think you
are ,aak!D4f me quite Impossible questions. I
do not know. In the flrst place, you say, Are
we going to be aalted to take over the land
defenae of Europe? The answer Is, of course,
we are not going to be asked to take over
the def'ense; the land defense of Europe. I!
you ask me whether In the future we may
be aeked to send more than six divisiOns,
how can I possibly answer that? I auppoae
It tbere Is war you wUl. Maybe 11 the situation gets better It will be less. Maybe 11 It
stays the same It will be the same. Maybe· I.'!
It gets IJlOI'e tense, there may be some additions to it. Op.~t.
u Senator SMITB (N.J.). Now, the Immediate queetlon I want to a.sk you Is this: Are
we buJ.ldlng up this European Army by puttl04f our divisions there at the moment, ln.
order to deter an aggression whUe they are
getting their strength buUt up. Will the time
oome when they wm be a.ble to defend themselves entirely without our aid so far a.s Europe Is concerned?
In other words, can we look upon thla a.s
a. gNdUally reducing contribution to the
European Army of our United States· forces,
&S we d1d on the Marshall plan from an ecorwmlc standpoint? W& started subate.ntlally
and reduced untU we do not h&ve to give
any more.
Now, Is our support, ground support, of a
Western European army on the same principle? Is It on the principle of giving them
strength and giving them courage to go
ahead and set up their force, but as they get
their own strength we wlll gradually withdraw from there and keep our forces mobUe
tor any part of the world where they may
strike?
General BRADLEY. I think the question of
whether a mUitary contribution to Europe
would be a decrea.slng one Is almost an Impossible one to answer at this time. So much
depends upon the making of a peace treaty
with Germany and the state ot preparedneM
of the other nations, the continued aggressive moves on the part of other nations th&t

are presently opposed to us, and their Ideology, I think, Senator Smith, that Is a rather
long-range question to which any answer
at this time would not be worth much.
Senator SMITH (N.J.). The only reason I
asked you the question Is because I understood In talking with General Eisenhower
that he thought we might think In tenns
of an approach similar to the Marshall plan
!rom an economic standpoint: that what we
are trying to do uow Is trying to put spirit
Into the European nations that may be fearful that we are uot giving them support. They
need It now more than they wlll a little later.
General BRADLEY. I think that Is true. They
need It possibly more now. And, 1t you can
look far enough ahead to the time when
France has 60 or 60 divisions and those other
countries have simUar size forces, the time
mlght arrive when we could withdraw our
forces altogether, and certainly when you get
a peace treaty with Germany you are going
to be faced with the question of reduction
of forces, because some of these people are
on occupation duties now; but that apparently · Is sometime In the future, and I
would prefer not to try to answer your question, which In my opinion Ia based on conditions which a.re going to exist a conslder111ble
time In the future, and I can perceive of
circumstances being possible which would
permit ua to withdraw entirely, but I say
that Is certainly &oing to be sometime otr.
Op. cit.
,. See Appendix D.
"Ibid.
"'Events !rom 1963 to 1973 which slgn111.-

cantly contributed to the lessening o! tensions between East and West:
1. Renewal of Franoo-&>vlet trade agreement. February 1963.
2. U.S.-USSR agreement to establish an
emergency co=unlcattona Une (hot line).
June 1963.
·
3. Tripartite treu.ty banning nuclear weapons tests In the atmosphere, In outer space,
and under water. October 1983.
ol. Approval by President Kennedy of U.S.
wheat sales to th~ USSR. October 1963.
5. U.S.-USSR II@TOOment of exchanges In
the sclentl.flc, technical, educational, cul~ural, and other ~Ids. Pebruary 1964.
6. U.S. restores MFN treatment to Yugoslavia and Polan<l, March 1964.
7. Renewal of U.S.-USSR trade agreement.
April 1964.
6. U.S. Romanian trade dlsci.UIS!ons. May
1964.
9. U.S.-USSR coDBular agreement. Signed
June 1964. Ra.tl.fled March 1967.
10. French-Soviet trade agreement. September 1964.

11. U.S.-USSR agreement on cooperation In
desalination of sea water. November 1964.
12. Warsaw Pact Pol1tlcal Consultative
Committee approval of the Ra.packl suggestion for a conference on European security,
Janue.ry 1965.
13. Franco-Soviet color television agreement. March 1966.
.
14. Italo-Soviet agreement on joint cooperation In peaceful uses of atomic energy.
October 1965.
15. U.S.-USSR consulllll' convention. December 1965.
16. Italo-Soviet cultural agreement. February 1966.
17. Italo-Sovlet eoonomlc, sclentlflc, and
technlca.1 cooperation agreement. AprU 1966.
18. Yugoslavia becomes full contracting
party to OA'IT. AprU 1966.
19. De Gaulle's vls1t to the USSR. June
1966.
20. Franco-Soviet apace research agreement. June 1966.
21. PranccrSovlet sclent111.c, technlca.1, and
economic agreement. June 1966.

22. Plat-SoVI.et agreement for construction of a Plat factory In RUBS1a. August
1966.
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23. Renault and Peugeot agreements with
the USSR regarding cooperation with Soviet
motor Industry. October 1966.
24.
Koeygln's vlalt to France. December
1966.

25. Establishment of joint Franco-Soviet
permanent commission. December 1966.
27. Establishment of joint Franco-Soviet
chAmber of commerce. December 1966.
28. North Atlantic Ministerial Council
declaration emphaslzl.ng a wllllngness to
explore ways of developing cooperation with
the USSR and the states of Eastern Europe.
December 1966.
29. Franco-Soviet atomic energy cooperation agreement. January 1967.
30. Franco-Soviet trade agreement. January 1967.
31. Kosygln vls11o to the United Kingdom.
February 1967.
32. Fanfanl vlslt to Moecow. May 1967.
33. Italo-Soviet agreement on cooperation
In tourism. May 1967.
34. Italo-Sovlet consular convention. May
1967.
35. Poland becomes full contracting member of OA'IT. June 1967.
36. U.K.-USSR establish London-Moscow
teleprinter line. August 1967.
37. Harmel Report of North Atlantic CouncU proposes discussion of mutUal and balanced force reductions In Central Europe.
December 1967.
38. Announcement of plans for Joint
Franco-Soviet space re&ee.l'ch. January 1968.
39. Prime Minister Wilson's visit to the
USSR. January 1968.
40. U.K.-USSR sclent111.c and technological
agreement.
41. NATO declaration calling tor discussions of mutual an<l be.lanced force reductions. June 1968.
<12. Signature of the non-proliferation
treaty on nuclear weapons. July 1968.
43. Natural gas delivery contract consummated between the State of Bavaria e.nd the
USSR. September 1968.
· 44. U.K.-USSR c1vll air agreement. December 1969.
45. Franco-Soviet clvU •1r agreement. December 1969.
46. ltalo-Sovlet long-term agreement on
the supply of Soviet natural gas to Italy.
December 1969.
·
47. Soviet-West German agreements on
supply of Soviet natural gas to West Germany. February 1970.
48. Opening In Vletnna of U.S.-USSR negotiations on strategic arms ltmltatlon (SALT).
April 1970.
49. NATO declaration on mutual and balanced force reductions. May 1970.
60. Signing of non-aggression treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the Soviet Union. August 1970.
51. Prooident Pompldou'a vlalt to the USSR.
October 1970.
62. Signing of Franco-Soviet protocol on
Franco-Bovlet political cooperation. October 1970.
53. Signing of treaty of normallza.tlon of
relations between the Federal Republic of
Germany and Poland. December 1970.
64. Creation of a new basts for SALT negotiations. May 1971.
55. Ouster o! ha.rd-llne E&.st German Communist leader, Walter Ulbricht. May 1971.
66. Resumption of SALT negotiations. July
1971.
57. Soviet-West German agreement to open

consulates In Hamburg and Leningrad. July
1971.
58. Signature of flrst part of quadripartite
agreement on Berlin. September 1971.
59. Chancellor Brandt's vlslt to the USSR.
September 1971.
60. U.S.-USSR agreement on exchanging
ln!ormatlon on certa1n missile test1rig activities. September 1971.
61. U.S.-USSR agreement on Improving the
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"hot llne" between Washington and Moscow.
September 1971.
62. Secretary Brezbnev's visit to France.
October 1971.
63. Franco-Soviet agreement on economic,
technical and lnd\Uitrtal cooperation. October 1971.
64. Romania becomes a full contracting
party to GATT. November 1971.
65. Soviet-West German clvU air agreement. November 1971.
66. Ratlll.cation by the West German parllament of the West German treaties wi~
the Soviet Union and Poland. May 1972.
67. President Nixon's visit to Moscow. May
1972.
68. U.S.-USSR agreement on cooperation
In the ezploratlon of outer space May 1972.
69. U.S.-USSR agreement on cooperation
In solving problems of the environment May
1972.
70. U.S.-USSR agreement on joint elforts
In the ll.eld of medical science and public
heiLlth. MAy 1972.
71 . U.S.-USSR agreement on expanded cooperation In science and technology and tbe
establishment of a joint commission for this
purpose. MAy 1972.
7:1. U.S.-USSR agreement on cooperation
between the American and Soviet navies to
reduce the chances of dangerous Incidents.
May 1972.
73. Signing of the SALT Treaty. May 1972.
74. Signing of the ll.nal quadripartite agreement on Berlin. June 1972.
75. U.S.-USSR three year agreement on the
export of U .S. agricultural commodities (especially wheat and feed grains). July 1972.
76. Settlement of USSR lend-lease obllgatlons.OCtober 1972.
77. U .S .-USSR maritime agreement. October 11172.
78. Signing of U.S.-USSR Commercial
treaty. October 1972.
79. Quadripartite declaration supporting
Eaet and West German membership In the
United Natlona. November 1972.
80. Signing of the baste treaty on relatione
between the Jl'ederal Republic of Oerme.ny
and the German Democratic Repub1lo. December 197:1.
81. Opening of preparatory talks In VIenna
for negotiations on mutual and balanced
force reductions. January 1973.
82. Soviet-West German 10-year agreement
on the development of economic. Industrial,
and technical cooperation. and cultural and
educational exchanges. MAy 1973.
" Hearings on "Assignment of Ground
Forces of the United States to Duty In the
European Areas;" February, 1951, Committee
on Foreign Relations and Committee on
Armed Services, u .s .a., 82nd, let Bess.
n "Saturday Evening Post," October 26,
1973, page 27.
,. Houae Forelgtl Affairs Hearings, July,
1973, 93rd Cong., 1st Bess.
"It was with disbelief that I read the
newspaper reports of President Nixon's recent visit with President Pompldou of France
In Iceland and the reports that President
Pompldou told President Nixon that France
would fl.ght the removal of any U.S. troops
from Europe, even It done In the context of
the so-called "MBFR."
Here Is the President or one of the great
countries of Western Europe which removed
ILl! their b'oopa from the NATO Command In
1967 which has refused to participate In the
mUitary aepects of NATO since that time,
which responded very early to the changed
circumstances of Europe-Its political and
economic health vis-a-vis the East, telling
the President of the United States that
France would protest the removal of any
American troops from the NATO Command In
Europe.
It Is statements of this character that
makes one wonder about the viability of U.S.
European policy on forces In Europe. "WashIngton Poet," June 1. 1973; June 28, 1973. See

also Addreas by Michel Jobert, French Minister of Foreign Alfalrs, Before the National
Assembly, June 19, 1973.
.. ··The MUitary Balance 1972-1973." International Institute of Strategic Studies.
London, England, pg. 90. See also Testimony
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcommittee on MU!tary Appllco.tlons, AprU 16,'
1973, 93rd Cong., 1st Sees.
""The NATO military objectives are
deterrence and defence. Yet NATO, and the
United States In particular , maintain allpurpose, onens!ue-orlented, expeditionarystyle forces that do not provide the desired
deterrence because of their low initta.l combat
ce.pabU!ty and their destabUizlng tactical
nuclear posture. A force structure oriented
for deterrence and defence can be bought at
much less than present cost--as Soviet force&
In East Germany prove. Adjusted (equal
front-line platoon strength, dell.ned as Infantry, tank, cavalry, and anti-tank) peacetime division slices (the division Itself plus
Its share of non-divisional support personnel)
total approximately 42,000 for American
forces tn We,t Germany; but cmly 18,500 for
Soviet force, ." "The WastefUl Ways of
NATO," Steven L . C&nby, Sun>!val, Vol. XV,
No. 1, Jan.-P'eb., 1973, IMtltute Strategic
Studies, London, England.
"Testimony of Secretary Rush, House
Foreign Alf&lrs, July 10, 1973, 93rd Congress,
1st Sees.
"Testimony of Administration witnesses,
Hou6e Foreign Alfalrs, July 10, 11, 12, 1973,
93rd Congress, 1st Bess.
" Most recent statement of Secretary of
Defense Schlesinger that the U.S. Is doing
more than Its !air share In Europe. House
Foreign Alfalrs, July 1973, 93rd Congress,
1st Bess.
• I use the famUiar abbreviation, MBFR,
throughout, even though the more proper
abbreviation since the preliminary talka Ia
MFR. See : Final Communique of Preparatory
Consultations.
., The communique announcing the Intention to meet on October 30th Issued by
the countries Involved managed to loae the
word "balance." When the Senate last voted
on a proposed amendment to reduce U.S.
forces In Europe, the dlstlngulahed Chairman
ot the Armed Services Oommlttee received
a letter from President NiXon st.&tlng his opposition to the amendment partly on the
grounds that "we expect tbat Mr Broslo
will be received In Moscow next week to begin dlscuaslons on basic lasues of mutual and
balanced force reductions."
I do not mysolf doubt that this letter
from the President naturally had great
weight with our colleagues. But Mr Broslo
never got to Moscow and preliminary dlscuaslons on MBFR did not begin until this
past January, 14 months after that letter.
., "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions," Library of Congreas Study, 73-36F,
February 2, 1973.
77 There are 19 countries participating In
MBFR. See Appendix E.
18 I only wish that the classic argument of
doing things In unison with the Soviet Union
would be applied when It comes to the stationing of U.S. forces on foreign soil. AccordIng to ll.gures published by the International
Institute of Strategic .Studies, the Soviet
Union has about 16,000 troops stationed
outside of Soviet territory and Eastern Eu-,
rope, whereas the United States has about
300,000 military forces scattered around the
world, out.slde the U.S. and Europe. A
parity with the Soviet Union In this area.
would be a significant and constructive start
towards bringing America home again.
In Its Eastern European satellltes. USSR
has stationed 330,000 USSR troops. See New
York Times, July 20, 1973. The total USSR
troops outside of Soviet soli Is therefore
346.000.
"'See Louis J . Halle, The Cold War as History (New York 1967).

10 Testimony of WU!lam J. Casey, Under
House Alfalrs Committee, July 12, 1973, 93rd
Cong., 1st Bess.
"' See David P . C&lleo, Th.e Atlantic Fantasy
(Johns Hopkins PreBB 1970).

APPENDIX A
U.S. Mn.ITUY STRENGTH 0UTIUDE THE UNITED
STATES As OF MARCH 31, 1973

Total OUtside the Unfted
States ---~--------------- 606,000
U.S. Territories and Poslleaslons___ 42, 000
Foreign Countries--------•-------- 56-l. 000
Selected
Areas,
Southeast
Asia ---------------------

63.000

ThaUand ------------------------Afioat -----------~---------------

45, 000
18,000

VVestern Paclll.c ------------- 164,000

------------------------C--

Japan
PhUippinea ---------------------Ryultyus Ialanda-----------------South Korea---------------------Taiwan -------------------------Afloat

---------------------------

18, 000
15,000
40,000
42,000
9.000
40,000

Other Areas ----------------

66,000

Bermuda -----------------------Canada -------------------------Cube. ---------------------------Cluam
Panama--------------------------Canal Zone_____________ _

1, 000
2,000
3,000
17,000
10,000
7,000
16,000
10,000

Puerto RICO----------------------AII.oat ---------------------------Other ----------------------------

Western Europe and Related
Areas -------------------- 313, ooo
2,000
Belgium ------------------------Germany ------------------------ 228,000
3,000
Iceland -------------------------Italy ----------------------------- 10,000
3,000
Greece ___ -----------------------1, 000
~orocoo ------------------------2,000
Netherlands --------- ------------2 , 000
Portugal ------ -------------------9 , 000
Spain --------------------------7 , 000
Turkey
-------------------------United Kingdom
_________________ _ 21,000
23,000
Afioat --------------------------2,000
Other ---------------------------LESS THAN 250

Antarctica, Bahamas, Bahrain, Lee}Yard
Islands, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia,
South VIetnam.
LESS THAN 1,000

Australia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Greenland,
Iran, Johnston Island, Midway Island.
All other countries: Less than 100 u.s.
military personnel.
OSAD (COMPTROLLER).
Directorate for Information Operations.
U.S. MILITARY STRli.NGTH 0UTsioE THE UNITED
STATES AS or DECEMBER Slt 1972

Total Outside the United
States ------------------- 635, 000
U.S. Territories and POBse8Sions____ 42,000
Foreign Countries _________________ 593, 000
.Belected
Areas,
Southeast
Asia --------------------South VletnaDl ___________________

97, 000
24,000

Thailand -----------------------Afloat ---------------- -----------

43, 000
30, 000

Western Paclll.c ------------ 162,000
Japan --------------------------Philippines ---------------------Ryukyus
Islands-----------------South Jrorea
______________ __ __ ____

20,000
16, ooo
42.000
38, 000
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Taiwan ----------~-- ----- ------Afloat ---------------------------

69,000

Bermuda ____________ • ___ _______ _
Canada _____________ ____ _ --------

1, 000

2, 000

3,000

Ouatll ____ ----------------------

1, 000
17,000

Afloat ---------------------------

6,000
16,000

10. 000

13,000

Western Europe and Related
Areas ~----------------- - 307, 000

9, 000
38,000

Other Areas ___ ____________ _

Cuba -------------- ---- --- ------Ethiopia ------------------------Panama Canal Zone ____ __________ _
Puerto Rico . __________ ________ __ _

Other ------------ ---------------

United Kingdom __________________
Afloat --------------------------Other --------------- - ----------LESS THAN 250

Bahamas, Bahrain, Johnston Island. Leeward Islands, New Zealand, No rway, Saudi
Arabia.

2,000
Belgium ------------------------Germany ~----------------------- 221", 000
Iceland ____ ____ __ ---------------3,000
Italy ------------- ---------------- 10,000
3,000
Greece _ ----- ____ --------------- _
1 , 000
Morocco __ _____ -----------------Netherlands _____ _______________ _
2 , 000

Portugal ----- - --- ---------------Spain __ - - ----- - _-~- ------------Turkey ____ --------- _______ - - ----

21,000
24,000
3,000

LESS THAN 1,000

Antarctica, Australia, Cyprus, Greenland,
Iran, and Midway Island.
All other countries: Less than 100 U .S .
military personnel.
OASD (COMPTROLLER )'

1, 000
9,000
7 , 000

'

Directorate for Information Operations.

APPENDIX B
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE- MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DEPENDENTS.LOCATED IN ALASKA, HAWAII, U.S. TERRITORIES, AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES, AS OF SEPT. 30, 1972
Total dependents

Dependents of U.S. citizen civilian employees •

Dependents of active duty military personnel

OSD-J CS

Total .... ________ __ ___________

and other

NaMa~~~~

A1r

Army

Corps

Force

DOO
total

Corps

Air
Force

DOO
total

Army

Marine

Army

Navy

465, 779

170, 683

9!, 356

202, 950

69, 547

14, 395

197)608

28, 581

15,035

Alask•-------------------------·--Hawaii. ............... _. ___________

36,915
63, 451

14,985
14, 182

I, 430
31, 197

20, 491
17.964

34, 557
60,410

13, 905
13,091

I, 158
20,327

64
9, 028

19,430
17,964

2, 358
3, 041

1,080
1,091

U.S.19rrltori03 .......... ____ __

31, 342

6, 946

11, 296

12, 906

28, 121

6, 012

8, 848

618

12,643

3, 221

934

Guam ___ _______________ _____ ____ __ _
Johnaltln Island .............. ______ _
Midway Island ............. ________ _
Panoma Canol Zone ............... . . .
Puerto Rico ........................ _
Somoa (American).... _______ .... ..
Vlrfl)n l1l1nds.. .................... .
Wa~. lsllnd.... ........ -- -- --. .

12, !53
17
742
12, 299
6, 089
26
14

Burma ••. __ .···--- - --- .•••••••••• _.

Cambodia .. _ ---------------------Canada _ .. _ ..................... .
Canory Islands .... _...... .......... _
Cape Verde Islands _________________ _
Chile. ____ •••• ___ ............. __ .. ..
Colombia ...... __ •••• _...... _•• _... .
Con10 (Brauaville)____ __________ ___ _
Costa Rica ..... _____ ...... _________ _
Cuba. ___ ..................... _.. ..
Cyprus........ _________ ___________ _
Czechoslovokia..... _.. ___________ __ •
Denmark •• ______ ._. _____________ __ _
Dominican Republic _________________ _
Ecuador ___ • _________ ___ __________ _
El Salvador ___________________ ____ __
Ethiop1a (includml Eritrea)__________ _

4, 987
17
9
4. 421
3. 471

I .............. .

Forelan countries and areas_•• _ 334, 071
Af1h1nlston ..... .......... ....... .
Araentlno·. _..................... ..
Australia
.... _.. ___ .. ____ ____ __ __
Austrl1
..... ----------- ---Bohomn • -- --------------------Bahrain . ---------------- -- ------- Borbados .................. ___ ...
Belaium . . ------------------ - --Bermuda __ ----------------------Bolivll
---------------------------Brazil ............
_____________ _

12
7, 149
................. ..
---------733
6, 934
75S
.........
2,61~
-------- 26
---------15

17
46
I, 24,

42
152
246
85
3,039
1. !27
118
170
12
6
3, 190

134,570

47, ~43

151, 589

17 .. .. .............. ..
21
25
623
613
38
1
3
.... ....
152 ---------·
---------246 ---------85 ------ ---1. 795
200
I. 014
I, 127 ........ ..
------- -- lJJ
!
4:.
28
64
46
.
~ ---------•
__________
674 --- T498-

3 ----------

3 ----------

437, 198 . 155,648

Navy

7, 414

Fo~~~ a:~~j~~~
5, 342

790

I, 061
208
I, 832 ........ ..

118

I, 830

194

263

9

10,645
1a
5,473
173
4,987
1, 508 _________ _
I-,503 __________
5
17 ------------'------·------·--17 --------------------------··---------------------723 · ____ ----714 ---------9
19 ---------19 -------------------10. 948
6, 000
533
106
4, 309
1, 351
934
116
112
189
2,114
312
3, 320
343 ----- ----192
!51 -------- 5, 746 ..........
26 .... .. --7
19 ----------------···---------------------------------------15 _____ ,___
7
8 --------------------------------------------- ---- ---------1 --------------.. ...... ..
I --- ---------------------------------------------122,640
=-.:sss=w-.--;n~
gslR930
3, 544
4, 018
469

=39:214=

m,llO-·

19,

17
17 .... -----.-.- ...... ... --- ... -- -- ---- .. -----------------------------------------46 ---- - ---14
7
25 ------- --- ------------------------------------ ---1,221
5
588
15
613
20 ---- ---- -29 ----------- -- --- ---41 ---------37 -----------I _____ ______
3 ___ __ ____
I _______________________________
I ------------------ -----------152
152 __________
__ .. ___ ,.
246 ---------237
9 -----------------------------------------------------------85 ---------85 ---.---------------------- -·. ------------------------- .. ------------ ..
2,792
1,578
186
14
1,014
247
217 __________ ____ ______
Jn
732 ------ --- 680
52---------395 ---------395 ................... 99
53 ..........
1
45
19
10 -----------------9
115
6
54
9
46
55
22
1 ---------32
12
3
4
5 -----------------------------------------------------------3
--------- ---- ------------------ ----------3,0476 __________
5613 -----------50 -------------2,436
143
__________
63
62
18
3 -·------- -- ---------

3 ------------------------------------------------------------

4 ---~-- --4 ---------4 ------------------ - 4-------- --- .. ----- ------------------- --------- - ------.. -- - --39 ---------19
12
31 ---------12
7
12
8 ------ -----------------------8
98
50
16
19
72
37
8
8
19
26
13 ---- ---------------13
2
2 -------------------2
2 -- .. ---------------- ----- .. ------------- --------------------- ------------------23
17
3 ---------17
14 ---------3 ---------6
3 -------------------3
1, 054 ------- --881
173 _________ ,
161 ---------161 ---------- ------- - -1,215 ---------I, 2!5 ------- --282
5
277 ------- --282
5
,208
69 -----------------------------------------------------------4
I
3 ---------4·
I ---------3 --------- --------- ----- - - ---------- ------------------------69
19
16
31
66
19
13
3
31
3 -------- - ----- ---------------3
81
26
43
9
75
23
31
12
9
6
3 ---- ---------------3
41
18
II ---------13
2
6
5 ------ --- 28
16 -------------------12
28
3
5
16
21 -------------------5
!6
7
3 -------------------4
1, 160
591
468
101
580
461
7
101
II
II -----------------------------1,149
1
39
25
14 ---------39
25
II
3 ------- --- ------------------------------------------ -------~~~ :c"ed_._-_: ~ :: ~£ ::::::::::::::::::::
190
120
56
14
170
101
51
5
13
20
19 ---------I ---------Germany (includina West Berlin) _____ _ 151, 019 103, 180
I , 579
46, 102 143, 580
97, 067
1, 406
144
44,963
7, 439
6, 113
29
I , 139
158
Ghana ..................... ___ .... ..
7
7 ----------------- --7
7
--------------..
----------------..
-----..
---------..
--------..
---------------Gibrlltlr ••• _________ ..... ________ __
1,326
16
I, 310 • --------1, 323
13
I, 310 -----------.------- 3
3 --------------- ---------- - -- -Greece (lncludtna Crete)............ ..
2, 237
131
51
2, 051
2,048
105 ---------Z3
1, 920
189
26
28
13.1
4
Guatemola... . . __ ... _______________ _
988
84
886
18
988
84
881
5
18 --------------------------------------------------H~ nduras ••• -------~-- -- ---------- 34
22 -----' . 7
25
18 ---------------- ---7
9
4 -------------------5
Hone Kong ................ ........ .
64
17
47 ---------64
17
33
14 ------- - ----- - --- --- ------- ---- ----------------------------Hunaary ................... - •.• ---- 8
7
I ---------8
7
1 ------------ ---- --- ----- ---- - - - ------------------------------ - --- ----·
2, 087 ______ ...
I. 425
662 .
I, 990 ..........
I, 295
33
662
97 ......... :
97 ............... ..
Iceland ..... --------------------- -57
23
22
6
6 ______________ _____ .. _______ -----------------57
23
28
. 6
lndtl . _ •.• -------- - ---- __ ___ __
t ndoneslo. _••...• _•.• _.•.• _..• _••. •
50
5
45 ------ ·-·5
770
287
24
454
Iran .... _ ...... ............... : .
509
15
476
18
lroland (Eire) . ------ ----------- --509
15
470
6
18 -- --------- ------------------------------ ---21
II
10 ......... .
21
11
8
2 ........ --------- ------- ................ .
14, 209
3, 101
4, 790
6, 318
2. 6~2
4, 322
171
6, 219
885
489
297
99 ----- 13,324
Ivory Coast_ ••• ________ ••••• __ ••••. 7.
5
2 ---------7
5 ......... .
2 ------------- -------- ----------- ..................... .
Jama•ca ... _. -- ------. ____ . ___ __ __
9 -- -------9 ......... .
21. 6~ ---Tsji6, ~
1. 24~ --· io:3jr---·uh _______ aao _____ i:o47 .... · J:io .. 2o
23, 976
4, 751
8, 504
10, 701
Japan
..•. ------------------ --- - 14
4
I
9
14
4 ..........
I
9 ................... .................... .
Jorda n . ---- ----- ----- .. ----- -t<Anya ••• • ••• ------------------3 ---------3 ---------3 -------------------3 --------- -- ----------- ---- ------------------------- .
28
18
10 ---------laos. ------28
18
9
1
-------------------------------------------------lebanon
..... _.----___ • ---__ ___------------.... _______ _
85
54
27
I
79
51
14
13
I
6
3 ....................
3
Leeward Islands__ _______________ __ __
115 ------ ---115 --------- 115 ---------115 -------- ----------- -- ----------------------- -------- ------- ---------.L1bena •• _____ .. ____________________ _
62
36
26 ---------62
36
20
6
----------------------------------------------------------lulemboura. _________ ____ ___ ~ _-- --4!
39
2 ---------7
5 --------- 2 -------- - 34
34 --------- --------------------Malawi..... ____ .. -----------------12
II
I ---------12
II ------....
I .. ------------------------------------- ______ .. ----- _..... ..
32
24
7 ---------~~--------iii'
______
--~.::::::::::
________
~-:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::-:
______ ___ ~
10 ---------10 ---------Marshall Islands......... _.... _.... .
33
29 -------------------2
2 ---------- ------------------31
Z7 -------------------4
Mex1co. __________ ._ _____________ ---87 ---------81. ----- -- -- ' 81 ---- ----- 48
33 ---------6 -----------------------------6
2,073
34
I, 982
57
Morocco_______ --------- -- ----- ----

7~

28~

~~ ------ -~~-------454' ------·-s-·-------c::::::::::::::::::::--·

...

:~~~Y·~~~1u~~~~\/J1~n~~!rdinia5::::

n_______

~=~~r~ ~t·:~~ ~~==::::::::::::::::::
~:r~!riinds.-~::: :::::::::: :::::::: :

Netherland Antilles......... --------New Zealand ..... -------------------

5

5 -------------------34
2, 121
3 --------- -

2, 790
635
3 --------- 316
5

m

1110

I, 9&g
2, 671

I~ ----~~~-------~~--------~~--------~--------~~--------~~-:::::::::::::::: ::::

601

3 --- ------316
5

26
8
2, 036
119
34 ---------85 ---------3 ----------------------------·------------------------------.... -----_
123
8
180 ____________: ____________ ______ __________________
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Dependents of U.S. citizen civtlian employees

Dependents of Ktlve duty military personnel

Total dependents

t

OSD- JCS
DOD
toto I

Paraauay __ • __ --- - - --- -------·-

---------------- ---------

Phihpptnes....
--------- .. ---Poland .••• • ···--·-·· · · ·· ···-·
Portua•l (udud1n1 Azoros)... ______ _
Rumama . . •
• ••• _ - ----Ryukyu Islands ...
~audt Arabtl .••• ------------- ••
Senegal
• _ -- - ----------------

DOD
total

Air

Force

Corps

2
8
2 --········
49
sco
4
3
32
641
293
19
13
8
7, 900
11, 978
7 . .••.
404
z. 392

46
32
29
27
502
113
12
5
2. 270
I, 594
355
27
34 ····-· ··· ·
20, 040
154
18
11
2.152
!>6
14
7
25, 860
9, 538
86
60
12 · ·-···-···
45
6

Nicaraaua. ___ • ------ --- -----------Ntaeua •• ----- ------ ---------- ----Norway •.. --·················- -····
Poklston .•. ___
--··-···· ·····-·
Panama, RepubliC of.. .•••••..•.•••..
Peru.

"·:r.:.~:

Army

7 •
2, 063
4

22,8~~

14, 259
22

Uruguay ________ .-- ----------------

U.S.S.R (Sov1et Unl<ln).•..•. . . ... ••••
Venezuela.- --- _____ ---------------Yuaosfovio...••.•• •••...••..... ___ __
Zoiro (Cool!>).•••...••••... _.•......
Und1stributod ••....•• ... -.••... --.-.

2~

13
4, 840
10
9
13
983
284
18

~

DOD
total

Navy

Army

Air

Force

and other
defense

actl'ltttes

7, 216
831
36 ······--··
30, 668
713
24 ······-- .
49
21
77
13
29
20
76
48
68
6

36 ··- -·····
2, 930
27, 013
11
13
Z5 ••••••• •
23
Z2
9 -----·· -·
1
27
48
14

s, 6~

z.

1, 15~

4 --9
9

~ ······-ij·-··-

3, 720
2, 357
20
I
12, 452
72
10 ········-·
30
21

6

8, 102
·•• ••·•·
······---·
.....•
3, 977
2, 084
·-····· ..
7
21
157
6, 228

8

7, 07~

50
24
12 ••••....••
31
6

2
22
4, 296
2, 820
20
I
13, 282
332
10 · ·····-·-·
30
21
26
13
5, 853
822
4, 202
I, 816
18 ---------36

Turkey _ ..•.. .
. .. -········-···
Umted Arab Republoc (E&ypt)...•.....
Un1ted Kinadorr> ••.••...••.... ·-·· ·-·

Air
force

37
27 ····-----2
8
9
5 ·····-·· · ···-·······
29
27 ·····--- -2 - - -----········································489
100
!9
10
340
I!
13 ···•·•·····•·•··· ..
12
5
4 ··· ····-··
3 ....... - -- ------ ---- ---------------2.051
I, 410 .•••.•.. . .
32
609
219
184 . ......•..
32
3
14
286
7
19
29
IS ··········· -----16
326
21 •••• •••. ••
8
5
8
13 .••••... .•....... -· ···· ··- _
13
148
6, 905
369
11, 673
945
6
626
305
8
19, 095
18
11
5
2 ·····-··-······---- · ········-······ -·--······ - -·-·---2, 652
53
351
3
255
190
3
50
137 ---

U·---- 2.i"
2 ------ i4.:.:·:·-8
227
I, 239

~~~:ftoR~PUbili: .. __ ::::: .: _=~:: :::::
South Afnca ••.•...••....••... .•.••.
South Korea..•••• • · · -····· ·--· ··-·
South Voetnam •.•..••.• '-···· ··-··-·
Spain
•...•(Coylon)
-----············-··
· · ···
Sri Lonka
_______ __ ______
___
Sweden .....• _
........ ---·-·
Switzerland ___ ••......••. __ •...
Ta1wan. __ __ __ .. --.•• ---- .---------Thoitand. _•. _.•••...••••. ------ - --Tnnidad____________________________
ond Tobaao..•...•••....•.••_
Tunisia

Marine
Corps

flavy

Army

··· i3)63·· · · 2)88
2. ••a"···---- 29······ 496 .
22
36
36 ---- ---- -----3 ···- --- ····--· ---·····---···· ·--······· ····------ -1
15
14 ······ - .
1 .:::::::_:::::::·:·::::::::·:::::::: :::: ::::::·:: ___ :::_

80
1, 210
576
463
74
29
10
'
6 ·······--········-·····------·········------ ___ _
182
7, 803
830
260
263
299
8
2 - ------·-- ·-····· · ······-·······-------------- --------

73
9
4, 395
8
7

2 -·-··············--··············------------·- - ---- -

1~ ·----·ui·

si·::::::::~:-11
4, 079
1, 807
155
68
2, 049
123
9
61
35
18
14 ····-·····
11
3 ·······--·
4 •• ••••••••
4 ···-···-- -- -- --36
a _______ ____
1
21 - --------··· ···· ·--··········· · ··----- ----------7,013
769
144
13
6, 087
203
62 ··--- ---- 141 ·- -38 ··••••···•
28 -------.-----------8 ······-···
8 ·····-·
29, 446
349
Z, 491
279
26, 327
I, 222
li4
160
686
12

1:

~: . ----ii"
13

5.1

~

~ .......

64

~~

6

-

~ -------~~- -----···f::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:·--------j

11

5

···T977······ isi······-ioil _______

12

Z2

34

10

19 ·············-················

19

1·······27-::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

.

14

4 ·-········-···-·····

4 -- ------ --

1Deplftdlftts of om ploy- po1d from opproprlated funds. Data for Alosko , Hawah and U.S. terntorios exclude dependents of U.S. citizen civilian employees who ore permoMftt res1denh and who
are employod In tho Stott or territory of lheir residence.
APPENDIX C
DEP"RTMENT OF

DEFEI~SE

CIVILI"N P£RSOflNEL BY COUNTRY, AS Of DEC. 31, 1972
Department of Defense
Toto!
tiYIIjen

personnel
WortdwkN tote!..

lnd1rtct

us

nationals

fore• an
nationals

69, 322

107, 328

cit1zens

977,971

Aluko.
11

~~h':,~ 48

Stotu end DistriCt of
Columble.. _

U.S. territories

hue

Fore1gn

1, 189, 030 1, 012, 380

United Stotts..•

977, 971 ---

----------------5, 465 •

5, 465
19, 888

Navy

"'my

DuKt hue

19, 888

l nd~rect

DuKt hire

us.

clhuns

364, 164

h1re
forettn
Fore•an
nthonals nat1onals
34, 820

77, 709

346, 358

u.s.

u.s.

3t9, oeo

------

20, 761

11, 178

lnduect OSC JCS
hue
anti othe r
foreian
defense
nationals nationals act1v1t1es

---forei11n

citizens
260, 809

---252, 925 •
----------

157
10, 722 .

2, 602 •
5, 793 •

1, 737

Duect hire

cttlzens

lnduect
h1..forelan
fore• an
nationals nationals

13, 363

18, 392

==;;=-=-:;:.

2, 684 .
3, 285

299, 849

5,163-

2, 372 -

67, 9GO

--·------- ....

246, 956

2, 096

22
88

67,850

-=- ..::·

560

68,774

~

310, 728 -

337, 963

952, 618 =9=
52='=
61=8=~
12, 7!)()
9, 080
I 3, 670

Air force

01rtct hHe

706 -

I

116

3, 759
814
264
249 15
4, 576
Guam
_ ••••
' · 840
33
2~ .
57
Midwoy tslood
_
57 2, 372
159
308
182
4, 646
828
1, 243
3, 403 •
691 106
Panan11 c;,nal Zone .•• _
1, 212
3
3, 199
3,196
3•
~
Puertollilo .
_
7
1, 068 --8
8
Waloe lolaod
8 - -- ·Foreian coontrieo llld or_ ____ •.... . 198, 309
1:698
3, 169
20,201
16, 069
32, 448
77, 709
11, 178
5, 788
12,657
25, 329 165, 652 •107, 328
18,392
Alahanillan •....•••••.... _______----:3
:-__-_-__-_-__-_-_----::3-.-_-__-_-___-_-__-_-__-_-_--_ _____________:_____;_____:____:____:.:.:_:_:~--~

-

Araentlnl •. --······--··--······
Austrofla.......................
Austr;. . ···············-----·-·

3J~
6

2~

2

-----

··-r::::::::.: ·· ··· ·2·:::::::::::::::=::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

12 .••.••••••
I. ·
289 •• ····························-··-·····
4•
• •
•• • •••
•

Z5

288 ··-·······

2 ·······-············

5

ma~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ =~2~:0~ ~6 ------~r~ 4-:_-:_:_:_:_:_~_~_:_:_~: ~~~~~3--::~:~~::~8: :_-:_:_: _:_;~;:_;_; ::::~;~:::~:~:~~Hm~~~~~~~~~~~~um~m~~~ ~~L :=::::~i
Bol1voa.........................
Brazof..........................
Bulaarla. ················-----Burma •• --------------- - - ......

ss

16

4

3

I
1

~~

!

Cambodia •• ·---------------- .
Canada (lnclud1n1 Newfoundland).
Chod.. •••••...•••••.• ...••.•••

7
I
951
135
1 ••••••••••

Costa R•c•······ · ··--· · ··-· ··--·
Cuba. • • -·····-···········
Cyprus .••.. -----············-·

I, ~
1
253
1 ·-········

g~~~~bla·::::::::::::::::::::::

j~Ji~;t~,;. .;~ \ ~
France.. ........... ............... . .

Germany __ ···-···· -···----···

FooLnotes at end ot table.

1

:3.:7i

2,!1

73,437

11,013

39
2
3
6
816
1

_ ___
•.•..•••••
6
16 ..........
---··············-······ · ···················· ·······························-···-· ············· •
................. ...... .................... ••
----------------··- ------------------------ ____ _____
__ •••••..•••.•••.••••••••..•••..•.••• .'...
. ·-··············
4 . ------··
l8······· 12L::::::::~----·-- 48··--·-·66L:::::::::
•• ·-····-···-········
•..•.....•..•
·················-···············--·· ·············-·

·····T ······-2·=::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::·.:

~~ ·-· - ·· ---·--· 1·
·····-··-········--·-····-·············---------···· 6 -----------·
- ······-·· • ···············-··- ·······-·· ··· -···----·-····-·-··
d _··_ ·.-• ..·.--·•..-.-.- ..-.··.·.-..·..........~ •-.·..··.·.·.·.·.-.·.···
_.... __ 877.......
.......................
.
253
•....•..••...........••.•..•• ::::::::·· __
I .

..

.

4:1i4~ ~ l;~2 :~ ~ l l l l l \: : , 11: 1\ ~llllll: lllll~ ~ ~ ~ '~l l l l :
:

39

,1'3,:

62, 385

9, 734

:

7

32

2

54,449 ···

12·::::::::::-·--

··55·

2

1,188 ::::::::::-··

1:m

9

zo

3

1\

7
33
1
11

7
2

I
3

7
4
5

2
2
6
13
96

.s 14652
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APPENDIX e-:tontinued
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE- Continued
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BY COUNTRY, AS OF DEC.· 31, 197Z-Continued
Department of [)efense
Direct hire
Total
civilian
per.;onnel

Foreign
foreign
citizens nationals nat1onals
U.S.

Direct hire

Indirect

u.s.

forelrn

hire-

Foreign

nationals nationals

citizens

Air Force

Navy

Anny
Indirect
'hire-

Direct hire

u.s.

Foreign

Indirect
hireforeign

citizens nationals nationals

Direct hire

Indirect
hire-

Foreign
foreign
citizens nationals nations
U.S.

OSD-JCS
and other
defens~

activities

foreirn countries and areas-Continued

Ghana.······-·········-··-·-·-Greece (including Creta).....•...•

Guatemala ________ .•• -- __ -------

Haiti_ ________ _________________ _
Honduras ___ ---- ___ : ____ --------

Hona Kin&----------------- ----Hungary....... _. _.......... __ . _
Iceland _______ -----------------India. _____ ---- ____ -------- ---Indonesia.
___ ---- __ -----------Iran
_______________________
___ _
Ireland....•............ ·-·-·-·Israel (including Jerusalem).··-·Italy (including Sicily and Sar-

I ----···-~611
132

4

3, Z41
Ivory Coast.. .......•........•..
Jamaica.
__ -- ___________________
-----------------_
I ---------Japan
________
I 45,020
5, 581
Jordan .------------------------

laos ------------------ --------

liberia ..••......•... ··--·-·-··.

luJ:emboura. ___----------------

Malagasy Republic~· ······- -----
MalaWI. •...•.....••••...•.•••••
Malaya, States oi.. ... ------·-·-Malta ..•.......•...............
Marshall
Islands............... _
.
MeJ:ico ________________________

Morocco... ------------ .. -------

~:r:!;.-;rid•:

:::::::::::::::::::

New Zealand ........ •. •... ... . •.

Hicara&UI-------- ---- -- ------.-

- Nfkeria........................ .
Norway ••....... •..............
Pakistan ••..•...•.•.••..... . •. .
Panama _________ ------------ -- -

Paraguay...•....•..............

~m.;j,r.;e;:::::::: :::::::::::::
Poland ........................ .
Portugal (induding Azores) ...... .

Rumania. ______ ----_----------Saudi Arabia ...•.......•........
Senegal ....................... .
Seychelles Islands .............. .
Singapore. ____ . ___________ ----South AtriCJ, Republic ol.. ...... .
South Korea ...•.• .... .........•
South Vietnam.·· -·········-····
Spain (includin& Balearic Islands).
Sri Lanka (Ceylon).••...........
Swaden ...........••........ ...
Switzerland ..... _... _.• _... _... _
Taiwan.•. •••.•...•.•.•.....•.••
Islands:
Thailand ••....•....•••..••.•...
Trin_l~ad and Tobaao....•.......•
TU('IISII _______ _________________ _

~~r~el"Arib.lii.>ulilic.(fay·p-1):::::
Unilad Kinadom . •.. .•... ........

~~~\u(~oviii

i.inloii)::: ::::::::::
Venezuela .......•.•.•.•..... --·
Yugoslavia .................• ••••
lalre (Congo)..•.....•..........
Undistributed •••••••••••••••••••

i ------·T

I

11
3

I -------·-·--·---·--·--·--··-··--···-·-···········-· ·--- --·····-··-·· -····-···-··-····----····-···· ·---·----·-·--------3 -···-·········-·-···-···········-·····-··-··-···-·-···----·-·-···· ····

4
13
3
569
20
27
181
I
3

I·

·-----~~~- '

dinia)•.•• --------------------

lebanon ____ _• _______ ----------L..ward Islands ........•......•.

~ ----········-········-·--··-··-·---···- ··-······-···-··-············-·················-·············
43
436
61
37
Z
24 ··----·-··
92
4Z --·-·--···
342
6 -·---·-·---·--······
4 - ·-·-··---·--·-···------·····- ·-······-······· ·-···--·-··-···- ········

7
I
I --·----··6
z
13 --·-····-4
1
703
134
21
I
31
4
202I _________
21 _

4~

~~-----~:~~~-::::::::::

~:~

~~~.::::::::::

~:

~~-:::: ::::::

:::::::::: ••••••
•••••. .....•.
....••. ••.•••
I -··--··-···-····-·····-· ··· ······-················ ··-· ········· ·····-·····-·· ·-·-·-·········-·······
1, 4Z4
38,015
2, 124
72
18,871
I , 063
I, 344
10,398
Z, 381 ..........
8, 734

Z,

I

3
-·-·-----·------·--·--··---·-·-······-----···· ·-·-···--·-·-··-····---··-····-·-·-····-···-·········13
····------·-·-·--·-·-····-·-······--························-·-·····-···-·-·····--········--·-······
4
-·---··-·-·----···-····-·-···-····-----128
~50 -·······-·
19 ·····-··············
···--·--·····-···········-······-····-·I
7 ········-··········6 .••.•...••
7
·------· -3 -·-------·---··-·-·I
Zl -·-·····-·-·-·-·-·-·-···-···-···-·····-·
6
----·----16
176 -·-···---·-·-·-·---·--· -·····--·-·-··--I -··-····-·-·····--··
9
-·-·-·-· - ·----·--···-·-·---···--·-·-···-·--··-······-···············-············-·-···-····-·····-·
1
·--··-····-·-·-··-·····-·-·-·-····-·····-·······-· ··-······-·-·······-1 ················-·-·
3

i ::::::::::::::::::~:::::: :::~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::····-···;·::::::::::

1~
1
33

~

1t --------~-------· ii·:::::::::::::: :::::: ··· · ·- ·~
i
14
14 -------··-···-·-·-··
14 -·-··-·····················-·····-···-··········-···--·····-···-·-·-·-·-····--·· ··········
I ---··--·-·
I ··--·----·----·----·····--·· ··-···-···-········--·····----·········--····-···-···---···---·-·-······
1

1 ---------2
I

s·::::::::::........ .::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::····--··s· ::::::::::· ········

I -·-------·------·---·-----···················-···-------·-·-·····-··-············-···-···--··--···-I ·----·-····----·--·-··-··-··-·-·······-········-···-·-·······-······ ······· ····-···-·---·------·-·-·

1
2

~

~

1 ··-······1. ..... .... ................•..•.................••...••..•.•. ..•.... ... ....... .....•••.••••...... .•.. .
I
66
66 ······ ··············
66 ······· -············ ········· ······· ············· ····· · · · ·····-············ · · ··········
69~
11t
~~ ······s72 ·······47 ····-··· -s-: :::::: ::: ·······s.~-·· · ·····i ... . ...sh :·::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
~

41~

··-···i36-

A··-····T
4 ··-· ······
69
31
21
Z
I
9
4
16
6
1,146
16,554

8

3

.....266

107 ·················21ir:::::.::::::::::::::::::::::·:·

... 27 ·::::::::::···-···s.~·

· l ::::::::::::::::::::······ r:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ... ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
4
38
Zl
I
5
10
15,408

···················1 ··················· ·-······ ·•···· .. .. . .. .. ......
••••••• •••
30
5 ••••••••.•••••••• •• ••• • .•.••.••.•..•.•.•..•.•.•.•
... ... . • . ... . . . .. .. ........ .. . ... ..•. . . .. .... .....
8 •. . . . .••• •• .• . • .• •••

~

1 •·•••••···
29 ....•.....
7 ••••••••••
••........•...••..•.• .• ........•....•.•..............•.••..•..•••.••..
················•·•·• ·•••·•·········· .... ···· ········-··············· ·
·····························-········································
..........
39Z
12,825 .........•
745
Z, 497 -·········

2
5
6
1
6
13
9

5 ---·-·-·-·-·······-·····-······-········-··········-·······························-·-···----··--·-·
922 ···---·-·3
7 -····-··-·
93
32 ..........
111
879 -··-·-·-· ·

8

.••....•..•.•..••..•
•···••·•·••··•·•·•·•
··-················· .
.........•
5

1
3
3
81

1,136
4
3Z

Zl4
I
11

5
3 -···--·····-·········-·-·····-····-··--·-···-·····-·-···-·······-···············-···········-··--··4
21 ------···I
16 ........................... ,............
10
4 ·········1
I··-·· · -·-~--··-·-·-·····-···································-· ·-··················-·····-·-···-····-·· ---·-··I
I
I ··-···-·---·-···-·-·
I --··-··-··-······--··-········ ·-············-········-·······-·-······-·----·-····- ·······
42
20
Z2 ··-·-·-·-·-···-···-·--····-·-·-·····-···
12
,
15 ···-·····8
3 -·----·-··
4
5 -·-·-·· --5 -·-···-·········-·····-·······--········-··········-···············-···········-····-···· ····-·-·--·
5
1,130
12,111
3,644
850
10,724
3, 644
93
241 ...... ....
180
1,142 ·--·······
II
16,885
18,103
571
17,532 -·-··-····
426
16, 456 -··--·-···
98
352 ·······-·.
24
713 --···-·-·34
Z, 600
744
1,1165 --·---····
408
59 ·-·-···-·146
I, 071 ·-······-183
730 ··-·-··-··
12
I ..........
I ----·-···--·-·-·-·--··---···-·-·· ·················-·············---·····-····---·--·-···-·--·-·-··-·
I
7
z
5 ---··--··-····--····-·--····---··-··-···-···· ·················-···-·-·-·-·-·····-·-·-····-····-·-·-·
7
5
- 3
2 ··-···-···-·---·-···-·-·····-·-·-·-·-···-·-·············-·········-···-···-·····-···-········-···' · ·
5
I, 934
254
1,680 •....•... . ·
65
205 -·-·······
69
6-45 •........•
115
825 ••..••.•. :
10
7,020

266
6,727
27
105
2, 444 ..........
I --·-·····'···-··--·-···-···············-··-·······

I
6

996
106
3, 553
10
16
13

z

379
4
1, Z49

I

4
5

4
9

1
I

117

100

4
617
102
796
9
IZ
8
3

69

257 ..........

83

4,013 ..........

49

I -·-·········· ······-··· ······-····-·-···-··--·--····-·· ·····

-····-·-·2
3 -·····-·····-···· ·:············-·······-·· ········-··· ··-·--·-·-····-·
···-·---·Z59
115 --··············· · ···-········ ········-·120
498 -··-·-·--·
4
··-·········-······ ······ · ...•.. :.......
4
102 ····························-·-··················.
1, 506
713
479
66
113
309
61
412 •..•... ...
I, 381
19
····-··--···-·······
5 ····················· ······-··········-········-·······-············· ·
5
·····-·····-··-·-········· ····-·····--··-··-·······-·-·-·-·····-···········-···-······-·····-······16
-·-··-···I
3 -·-·-·-·-·-·- ··············-···········-···············-········-·-···
9
-·--··············· ····-··-·········-···--····· ····-·-···--······-···-·-···-···-··· ········--······4

8 ··-·-·-·-·

I

17 -··--·-··-

6 ·-·-·················-··········-···-··-·--··········-··········-···--

67 ······-······ ·······

•Includes 32 and 346 Direct Hire Foreign Nationals of OSD and Other Defense Activities in terri!Dries and forei&n countries respeotively.

3 ········-···-·-····-

30

2

17 -· · ············ ·····

• Includes 49 Indirect Hire Foreian Nationals of Other Defense Activities.
• Includes civilians located in the Ryukyus.

APPENDIX 0
NATO 'AND SOME NATO SEGMENTS' TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S.S. R.-1951- lZ
(In millions of dollars(

NATO t total exports I with Eastern Europe •. ...
NATO total Imports with Eastern Europe _______
NATO total exports with U.S.S.R ... ...........
NATO total imports with U.S.S.R.......•.•...•
U.S. total exports with Eastern Europe .•..•...•
U.S. total imports with Eastern [uropa ......•••
U.S. total exports with U.S.S.R .••..•.•.•.•••..
U.S. total importJ with U.S.S.R..••••••••.•••••

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1-!156

19~7

1958

1959

1960

1961

515.7
753.8
129.0
283.2
Z.8
63.8

522.4
695.8
184.1
294.4
1.1

551.1
681.7
164.6
240.4
1.8
36.4

769.3
829.5237.
308.5
6.1
42.4

887. 5
I, 101.6
243.5
407. 8
7. 0
56.0

I, 159.9

16.

ll. 9

17.1

I, 368.1
I, 450. Z
444.7
53Z. 6
113. 3
62.6
3.4
17.5

I, 497.8
1, 69Z. 2
418.0
67Z.Z
89.3
80.9
7: 4
Z8. 6

I, 925.3
I, 978.0

%7.4

1, 303.7
I, 410. Z
412.3
463. 9
86.Z
61.3
3.6
16:5

I, 896.9
2, 089. 7
761. 1
989.3
133.4
81.1
45.6
Z3. 2

.I

39.6

(•l

J:~

z

.z

.3

I, 279.4
415.3
452.0
II. Z
65.5
3.8
24.5

67Z.8
876.4
193.4
81.0
39.3
22.6

July 25, 1973

1962
European NATO total exports with Eastern
Europe.. •
. . .•. • ••. • ••••.•..• • ••••
Europnn HI'.TO total imports with Eastern
Europe
_•
.• • ..... .... ...
European NATO totale.ports with U.S.S.R.....
European NATO totaltmports with U.S.S.R.. ...

NATO total exports wtth Eastern Europe ••••. •
HATO tolaltmports wtth Eastern Europe ... ... .
NATO total exports Wtlh U.S.S.R ....... .. . .
NATO total imports wtth U.S.S.R .. .. ......... .
U.S total exports wtth Eastern Europe .. ...... .
U.S. total Imports with Eastern Europe .... .. .. .
U.S. total exports with U.S.S.R............ ... .
U.S total Imports With U.S.S.R. . ............ ..
European NATO total exports with Eastern
Europe .• •.. _.-- - - --- ____ ---- - --- - - - -- European NATO total imports with Eastern
Europe. . ............................. .
European NATO total exports with U.S.S:R.... ..
European NATO total Imports with U.S.S.R.... .

s 14653
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1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

11969

11970

•1971

"1972

512.3

520.7

5-48. 8

757.2

869. 1

1, 083. 6

1,186. 2

I, 231.6

I, 371. 1

1, 695.1

I, 669.8

683.6

128.9
255.3

648.8
184.1
279.2

640.4
164.6
228.7

783.1
232.0
295.9

I, 040.7
240.5
390.1

I, 203. 9
386.5
426.5

I, 338.4
397.2
544.5

1, 3n.6
421.8
513.4

I, 598.9
397.3
641.2

1, 883. 7
625.0
850.5

1, 992. 9
691.3
968.4

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

•1969

•1970

• 1971

2, 144.6
2, 214.7
751.9
1, 043.5
125.1
78.9
20.1
16.2

2, 258. 5
2, 480. 0
792.5
953.8
166. 4
80. 6
22. 9
21.2

2, 835. 7
2, 574. 0
I, 023.7
918.7
339. I
98. 8
146. 4
20.8

2, 779. 7
3, 956.9
826. I
I, 149. 9
139.4
137.4
44.4
42.6

3, 397. 0
3, 449.1
925.8
I, 274. 4
!98. 0
178.6
4l7
4~. 5

3, 667. 5
3, 686. 6
I, 049. 8
I , 385. 0
195. 2
177.1
60.2
4ll

3, 956.1
3, 914.7
I, 294.4
I , 466. 0
216. 8
198. 3
57. 5
58. 1

4, 436. 3
4, 340. 9
I, 415.2
I , 581.8
249. 3
195. 1
105.5
51.5

5, 194.9
4, 948.8
I, 689.3
I, 724. 2
353. 3
225. 5
118. 4
72.3

5, 712.3
5, 599.6
I, 738.2
I, 860. 5
384. 0
222.7
161.8
57. 6

7, 477. 7
6, 609.3
2, 413.3
2, 066.9
818.2
320.1
546.7
95.5

I, 974.0

I , 912. 6

2, 054. 2

2, 357. 9

2, 833. 5

3, 304 7

~61 2.

3

4, 162. 3

4, 688. 6

5, 161.9

• 6, 308.4

2, 120. I
735.7
1, 025.6

2, 380.5
630. 4
930.4

2, 449. 8
584. 5
895.3

2, 879. 0
598.8
I, 098. 2

3, 220. 6
587.6
1, 214. 1

3, 436. 8
870. 4
I , 322. 7

3, 645. 4
I, 154. I
I, 387. 9

4, 075. 6
I, 399. 6
I , 518. 9

4, 658. 7
\ , 473. 7
1, 648. 1

5, 297. 6
I, 451.0
I, 790. 4

6, 187.9
I , 801.8
1, 956.0

'All NATO member countries.
East European Communist countnes.
Trade date with Alblnlo ucluded.
• Preliminary.
• Greece end Turkey trode ~mputod at 1971 levels.
'lnslanlflcont amount.
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APPENDIX E
RECORD OF PLENARY Mu:T!NO OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS HELD IN VIENNA ON
MONDAY MAT 1-l, 1973 AT 10:30 A.M.
Chairman (Mr. J . A. THOMSON). We have
gathered to resolve the question or pe.rtlcipatlon and procedures. In this connection we,
as I understand, are to hea,r nine points and
tour statements.
Mr. 0. N . KBI.uTov. 1. Representatlv• o1
the folloWing states a.re the p&rtlclpants In
the preparatory consultations related to Central Europe which began In Vienna on January 31, 1973:
The Kingdom of Belgium
The People's Republic of Bulgaria Canada
The Czechoelovalt Soctallst Republic
The Kingdom of Denmark
The German Democratic Republic
-rpe Federal Republic of Germany
The Kingdom or Greece
The Hungarian People's Republic
The ltaltan Republic
The Orand Duchy of Luxembourg
The Kingdom of the Netherlands
The Kingdom of Norway
The Poll.sh People's Republic
The Soclaltat Republic of Romania
The Bepubllc of Turkey
The Union o1 Soviet Socialist Republica
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland
The United States of America.
ll. Representatives or the following atatee,
which are potential participants In posalble
agreements related to central Europe, wUJ
take the necessary decisions by conseDBua:
The Kingdom of Belgium
Canada
The Ozechoelovalt Socialist 'Republic
The German Democratic Republic
The Federal Republc or Germany
The Orand Duchy ot Luxembourg
The Kingdom of the Netherlands
The Polish People's Bepubllc
The Union of Soviet Soc1allst Republica
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern lrelanct
Tlae United States o1 America
If another state wishes to be Included
among the •tatee ll.sted In thl.s paragraph and
thl.s Is agreect by conaemua of the repreaentatlvee of the •tates ltated In this para.graph, It
may be 80 Included. Such lncl\llilonln nego'lationa or decl.slons related to Central Europe could either be general or, 11 so agreed,
could be for the Umlted purpoee of taking
part In a particular decision or dec1slona rela~ to thla subject. It Ia uncteratood that
•uch 114dltlonal parilolpation In decl.slona,

Note: Differences in the valuetion

I 4

1972

or trade appear in various statistical series. Their relative

value In relation to the t6tals shown here, however, is insianificont in the process of abstractina
trends from this summary tabla.
Sources: Deportment of Commerce trade statisltco, OECO trade statisticS and assistance from
~;~~~~~~ ~~~~hDeportment of Stole, ~EU. Oario Scuka, analyst in int~rnational trade and fi·

a.greement:;, or measures would be without
prejudice to the security of any of the parties.
8. The following states wUI participate with
a special status:
The People's Republic or Bulgarta
The Kingdom of Denmark
The Kingdom of Greece
The Hungarian People's Republic
The Italian Republlc
The Kingdom of Norway
The Soclallst Republic of Romania
The Republlc of Turkey.
4 . All pe.rtlclpanta wtll be seated as listed
In p&ra.graph 3 according to the English version.
5. The chairmanship wUJ rotate from meetIng to m~tlng among the representatives of
the states listed In para.graph 2 ln the order
set forth In the English version . The ftrst
chairman wUl be drawn by lot.
6 . All participants wUJ have the right to
speak and to circulate papers on the s ubject
matter.
7. The meetings will be open only to the
partlclpants.
8. Following the opening statements, proceedings and documents or the meetings wUl
be con11dentlal except for those matters on
which It Is agreed In advance that another
procedure wlll be followed . There wUI be no
oftlclal recorda of meetings except as otherwlae agreed.
9. The omclal languages w1ll be Engltah,
French, German, and Ruaatan.
Mr. B. QuARLES VAN UFPOJU>. The representatives or Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United
States of America wlah to point out that the
arrangements tor the participation o1 Hungary In these consultations are w1thout prejudice to the nature of Hungary's pe.rtlclpatlon In future negotiations, decisions, or
agreed measures or to the security of any
party, and that, In partlcul&r, the question
of how and to wbat ext ent Hungary will b&
Included In future decisions, agreements, or
measures must be examined and decided durIng the pending negotiations.
Mr. E. USTOa. In connection w1th the unilateral statement of the representatives of
Belgium; Canada, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and the United States of
America the representative of the Hungarian
People's Republic wishes to state the followIng :
All the repr-ntatlvee of Hungary anc1 or
other aoolallat state. have explained during

the course of the consultations, Hungary
could consider participation In possible decisions, agreements, or measures only U the
appropriate conditions are fullilled .
Mr. B. QuAaLES VAN UFPORD. It Ia understood that the arrangement on participation
nnd procedures being adopted today will also
be applied In the forthcoming negotiations.
Mr. 0. N . KHLESTOV. It Ia agreed that the
arrangement on participation and procedures
being adopted today will also be applied In
the forthcoming negotiations. This does not
preclude the poaalbUity of raising the question of Inviting other European states to
participate In these negottatlon.s as observers.
Chairman (Mr. J. A. THOII4SON) . Are there
any objections?
I see none.
It wUI be so recorded .
TESTIMONY OF. DEPUTY SEC,JU;TARY HUS H. BEFORE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, JULY 25, 1973
U .8 . TROOP LEVELS 1N EUROPE

Mr Chairman : I welcome this opportunity
to discuss with you the level of American
forces In Western Europe. Since the United
States signed the North Atlantic Treaty In
1949, Congress has supported the continued
presence of U .S. forces In Europe. I believe
that there nre convincing reasons to conUnue
that presence and to avoid unilateral cuts In
our European troop atrengtb. I should like
to dlsousa these with you today.
Our forces in Europe serve several objec tives or U'.S. policy. In my remarks I wm address each of these In some detaU. But at th e
start I think It weuld be useful just to go
over them.
·
First : Our European forces play an Important role In deterrence. Relations between
East and West In Europe have not been
smooth these past 25 years. But they have
not come to military con1llct. It Ia our defensive posture and the Incalculable consequences of war tor an aggressor that have
time and a.galn turned us back from war In
Europe and toward negotiation.
Second : U .S. forces In Europe make a slgnll!.cant contribution to defense. In the unllkely event of mllltary con1llct, they would
poee a formidable l!.ghting torce. NATO's
conventional strength-to which we make an
Important contribution-must be capable of
meeting a Warsaw Pact attack without early
use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear strength 18
not enough.
Third: The presence of U.S. forces playa a
vital political role In our relations with Western Europe. It Ill the Tlsible evidence of our
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commitment to NATO's security. OUr Aillee, us t he wisdom of this commit m en t. Any reconftde n t of t h a t commitment, are maltlng duction In our force levels m ust take account
slgnlftcant strides In assuming an lncreaalng ot this approach and not oome as reflex acshare of the common defense burden. But 11 tion to our policies In some other part of the
we pu ll our troops out prematurely, tbat world.
p roce!lB will be jeopardized. And the goal of
The VIetnam exper ien ce Is clearly not th e
a strong, u n it ed Europe, sel!-rellant but only reason tor the current disenchantment
closely allied to t h e United States, may never with our contribution to NATO. It seems to
be realized.
m e that the drive to cut our forces substanFinally: Of special Interest to this sub- tially der ives In large m easure from some
committee Ia the role of our forces In Eaat- basic m isconceptions about current InternaWest negotiations. We have made stgnlllcant tional r ealities.
progress In the past several years toward our
At the risk or over-slmpllllcatlon, let me
goal of a s table and secure world at lower brlefty lis t what I believe to be the major
levels o r cost and r isk to the United States-. misconceptions :
SALT I , the Berlin Agreements, the VIetnam
First, that with progreaa towards detente
accords, new r elations wit h Ohl.na--t>J.l tbese a strong defense Is n o longer required.
are tangible evidence or progress. But much
Second, that our balance of payments probremains to be done. We are engaged In the lems and preSB!ng domes tic needs leave us
secon d phase ot SALT, In CSCE, In MBPR. no choice except to cut our forces kubstanTo succeed In these negotiations, we cannot tlally and unilaterally.
withdraw !rom the world. We cannot negoThird, t hat our European allies are getting
tiate !rom a posture or weakness and retreat. a tree ride by not malting a significant conIn my opinion, we should not consider uni- tribution to the co=on defense, and
lateral withdrawals of our troops from EuFourth, that our conventional forces are
rope when we are only 90 days away tram merely a symbolic "trip wire" and not a
negotiations to lower these forces mutually. eerloua military machine, and that In any
For the first time since the cold war began case they are unneceSB&ry as we can rely
the Soviet Union has agreed to negotiate upon a nuclear deterrent.
about a reduction of Its forces In the heart
Let me deal with each ot these In turn:
ot Europe. This Is a remarkable accompllshThere are some who argue thAt In fact no
ment--almoet unthinkable just a few years mllltary threat In Europe exists, that progago.
re&a In moving towards detente removes the
There are good reasons !or believing that need tor a strong defense.
t he Soviets are entering these tali.B with
The m111tary facta ot 111e provide no justlserious Intent. But It Ia obvious that they _flcatlon tor t h is point or view. Over the put
will have no Incentive to negotiate with ua de«_ade the Soviet Un!Dn lncreaaed. Its total
11 we cut our own troop s t rength unilaterally. mU!tary manpower by SO%, doubled Its pubThe eSBence of negotiations Is that you must lished mUitsry budget and vastly lncre.ased
have something to give 1n order to get some- Its nuclear forces.
thing you want.
WhUe the United 8tatee has decreased
The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks are the number of Its toroes In Europe over the
an example of this rule !amU!ar to all mem- past decade by over one-third, the Soviet
bers of this subco=lttee. Last year we Union has since 1968 Inc~ the number
reached agreement with the Soviet Union to of Its division !rom 26 to 81. In recent years
llmtt otrenslve and defensive nuclear weap- we have observed an Increase In the numons. · In that &il'eement we halted our on- ber of Soviet tanks In eastern Europe, the
going ABM program, and In exchange the Introduction of new a.lr defense mtsslles for
Sovie ts agreed to limit t heir own ABM de- the protectiOn or Soviet ground torcee, and
ployments and the further deployment of an Increase In nuclear-capable rocket
their giant 88-9 m !BBIIes.
launchers and cannon artillery. Thu.a the
It we had followed the advice of some to military foroes posing a potential threat to
give up the ABM prograw. unilaterally or to NATO, rather than dlm1nlshlng, have subreduce our ol!'enslve strategic programs uni- stantially lncrea&ed both 1n qus.ntlty and
laterally, I do not believe there would have quality.
been a SALT agreement last year, let alone
It the m111tary facta provide no justlllcaprOIIPecte far a follow-on agreement next tlon !or unilateral American withdrawals, do
year.
political realltlee :l>'nnlt 11uch a etep? We
This same natural logic applies to our have made sub6tantlal prosresa In moving
forces In Europe. UnleSB we enter the force from an era of confronte.t4on to an era ot
reduction negotiations this fall with our negotiations. Tensions In Europe have de,
troop strength Intact, the Soviets will have clined.
no Incentive to bargain. And the process of
But we have made this progress not by
normalization and reduced confrontation 1n wishful thinking about our adveraar1ee nor
which we have Invested so heavily over the by •bandonlng commitments to our allies.
On the contrary, we have reduced tensions
past 25 years will be placed 1n jeopardy.
As you well know, arms control discus- by demons ttatlng to our adveraartee that our
sions can yield not only substantial military continuing strength and determlnatlon lett
results but a continuing political discourse them no alternative but to negotla.te.
ot considerable value. In SALT, our candid
The progress we have made In recent
dlscUSBions with the Soviet Union did much years Is not Irreversible. In fact Europe's
to dispel common misconceptions &lld to cre- history glvee more grounds !or pessimism
ate a new atmosphere of greater confidence than optimism &bout t"e poeslbllitles tor a
and trust. That same posslbUlty lies before durable peaoe. Throughout a large part ot
us In the mutual force reduction tali.B. Thus modern his tory, Europe hae been either preproponents of unilateral American tocce paring !or, actually fighting or recovering
wlthdrawala would not only sacrifice the mil- !rom war.
Itary benefits of negotiating Soviet force reWe do not believe that t his periodic recurductions but also the slgnt.ncant poUtleal rence ot war In Europe has to continue to
benefits of such negotiations.
be the case. But to change Europe's history
I have ~led to determine In my own mind we must understand the continuing realiwhy there Is such a s t rong urge at this par- ties of lnternat1onall11e. In President Nixon's
ticular time to reduce our forces unlla.terally. words "War Is caused not by the strength of
Part of the reuon Is clearly that after our one nation alone b u t by the wealtness of
long and frequently frustrating experience one nation In :relation to another. suengtb
In VIetnam there 111 an understandable de- and resolution are a~ Incentive tor negoeire to bring our forces home. But our prob- tiation leading to peace. Weaknees s.nd naive
lems and pollolas In Europe are clearly dlt- sentimentality are an open Invitation to
ferent !rom th~ In Bouthellllt A.el.a. The pl'e'38ure tactics and aggression leading to
stabUity 11114 proiPflrlty made pOIIlible by our war."
poetwlll' commitment to Europe haft taucht
Some seem to believe that the western Eu-
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ropeans are strong en<7118h to provide tor
their own defense without a s!gnlllcan~
American presence.
History refutes this contention. Twice In
this century we have had to Intervene militarily In western Europe to protect freedom
and our own security.
It was our decision In 1949 to change
cou rse and to maintain a tangible and s ignifican t defense commitment In western
Europe which has made the past quarter
of a century one of Europe's most stable and
prosperous eras. This stability and prosperity have been of great benefit to us as
well as to the Europeans. Why should we
abandon such a successful policy?
I t Is simply fostering a misconception to
t alk about our forces being In Europe for
the defense or Europe alone. OUr contribution to NATO must be understood tor what
It Is: a matter or U.S. sel!-lnterest. Western
Europe Is the second greatest economic
power In the world, linked to the United
States by Innumerable strategic, political,
cultural and economic ties. It Is American
security which dictatee the necessity to deter
not only a full-seale Soviet attack on Westem Europe but also the application of Soviet
political preesurea--!or such preSBures could
give the Soviets veto power over western
European cooperation with the United
States.
There Is another dimension as well. A
primary objective or Amerl.can foreign polIcy this year Is to reinvigorate our relationship with our Allies, and to establish a
framework within which we can deal with
pressing problems of trade, ftnanoe and security.
We and our NATO a111es have been ablE>o
to forge · a prosperous and dynamic world
economy from the ruin of war because we
worked together, not only to rebulld the
world economy, but also to provide tor our
common security. There can be no prosperity without security just as there can
be no security without a sound economy.
We cannot abandon cooperation In one
sector without gravely damaging the other.
It Is that knowledge which has always provided the common sense bounds to our d11ferences on any matter.
That Is a reality that I hope you wUl take
Into account as you consider propoeals to act
unilaterally to reduce our contribution to
the co=on de!en.ae. It would not be prudent to assume that the good will and constructive effort that our Allies have brought
to the solution ot our oo=on trade and
monetary problems could be- quite the same
11 our cooperation In our co=on defense
had been eroded by substantial unilateral
troop reductions.
Let me turn now to another source of
pressures for unilateral American reductions. We are all agreed that this country has
a serious balance of payments problem and
pressing domestic needs. But we have been
moving vigorously on both these tt-onts and
with considerable success.
The results ot our monetary actions are
beginning tq take el!'ect. We believe the curr ency realignments provide the basts for
elimination of the long-stanc11ng U .8. deftclt
and restoration or International payments
equilibrium.
Department of Comm.erce data show a
drop In our balance of payments deficit !rom
$3.8 billion for the first quarter of 1972 to
t1.2 hllllon this year. That Is a very Impressive Improvement.
Plainly the speed our return to equlllbrlu.m. and we can do so with economic policies which leave us with a slgnlftcant mlllta.ry capability overaeaa.
There Is considerable misunderstanding
about tbe Impact our troops In Europe have
upon both our balance ot payments and the
federal budget. The result of our having
800,000 men and their dependents In Europe
1n PY 1972 was a payments deilo1t of tl.5
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bllllon. That is, after subtracting the value
or our military' exports and services to western Europe from the value of our m111ta.ry
expenditures in western Europe, there wa.s a
dllferenoe of •1.6 btlllon. This flgure lncludes West German purchases of U.S. mUItl'ry equipment tn !ultlllment of the usFRO olfset agreement. But It does not take
into account this two billion dollar agreement's assistance to our payments burden
In the form of substantial West German
purchases of U.S. Government securities
and west German rehabllltatlon of U.S.
mtlltary facUlties.
Equally Important, the 1.& btlllon dollar
figure must be looked at in the context of
our overall balance of payments. It Is comparable, for example, to the $1.2 bllllon
deficit caused by the larger number of
American tourists visiting western Europe
than western European tourists visiting the
United States. And It was only a sixth of
our total ba.slc payments deficit of over
bllllon In 1972.
Moreover, the deficit in the mllltary bal·
ance of payments was not a major cause of
our deteriorating balance of payments situation. The major problem was the Increasingly a.c1verse balance In non-mlllta.ry gooc1s and
service&.
And whUe the decline In value of the 11ollar Increases the cost of our troops abroa.c1,
It has a more-.slgnltlcant and favorable impact upon the competitiveness of our exports. Thus whtle the local coste of our troop
deployments in Europe have Increased, thiS
lnoreaae Is small compared to the favorable
Impact the new exchanges rates are having
on our $80 bUllon annual expf)rts of gooc1s
a.nd servl~. It Is in this non-mUita.ry area
where our inQreaslngly successful etrorts to
reestablish payments equUibrtum must continue to be focu88ed.
We have also been told that preaslng 11omeatl0 needa force us to cut our forces In
Europe unUaterally. But surely this 18 a false
choice. We always have ha.c1 'lilld always W1ll
have both clotnestlc and national security
need8. The point Is that we must devote
a.c1equate reaources--ln a carefully balancel1
way-to both.
Let us look at the record. In 1968 almost
one-half of the fel1eral budget went for 11efenll8, whtle only a thlrc1 was 11evoted to human reaourcea. Today these proportions are
reveraecl with human resources receiving half
the fel1eral budget anl1 defense receiving leas
than a thlrl1.
In 1968 the 11e!ense budget was n1ne percent ol GNP. It Ia now just s1x percent.
Surely thla Ia not an unacceptable buroen
for a oountry with a GNP of well over one
trUllon clollara.
Slnoe 1968 we have reduced the size of
our armel1 forces !rom 3.6 mllllon to 2.3 mtlllon. Ancl In Europe over the paat deoa<1e,
we have rel1uced our armel1 forces by a thlrl1,
from 466,000 to 300,000.
I believe that this Is a remarkable record
of foroe reduction and cost control. It certalnly demonstrates our oo=ltment to
spenl1 no more of the nation's llmltecl resources on clefense than Is absolutely necea-
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ae.ry.

Some seem to believe that by bringing our
forces home from Europe we would not save
money unle88 the forces that are returned
home are 11emob1llzed. But our mutta.ry establishment today Ia alrea.c1y at Ita lowest
level In two decades and tratts well behind
those of the Soviet Unlon anl1 China. If we
d.emobWze large numbers of our ste.ncllng
forces, we cannot maintain our NATO commitments or keep our pledges under the
Nixon Doctrine.
The bul1getary outlay for keeping our 300,000 men tn the European theater, anl1 that
Includes the Mediterranean Sea, ·1a .4.0 btllion for Flacal Year 1974. That Is the coet of
pay e.nc1 maintenance of these men anl1 their
11epenl1ente In Europe.

However, If we . consider the cost of the
support fa.cllltles in the Unlted States for
these forces and the cost of their arms and
equlpmlmt, the cost rises to .7.7 bUllon for
Fiscal Year 1974. That Includes the $4.0 btllion figure.
Within these costs there Is an Incremental
cost to the stationing of our forces In Europe
additional to the coat of slmtlar forces in
the United States. It rune to about $400 m1111on per year ami Is composed largely of such
expenses as transportation.
However, If you bring these men home and
maintain our NATO co=ttment, you wUI
have to keep them In uniform, and provide
the a.c1ded transport and duplicate heavy
artns In Europe so that they can be rapidly
returned to fight there. In that case, the
annual budget cost wm actually be more
than at present. Thus, those whose aim Is
reduced budget coste must be speaking not
about unilateral reductions from Europe but
rather about untlateral demobilization. This
Administration rejects such an approach.
You wm alao have heard the figure of
•17 billion. That Is the coot of all the u.s.
armed forces, wherever located In the world,
that are committed to NATO and would be
deployed In the evelllt of hostilities. It is not
the cost of our troops now In Europe, nor
would this amount be eaved even If we
withdrew all of our forces from Europe.
In sum, I hope you will agree with me that
even substantial reductions of our forces
In Europe W1ll neither save money nor resolve our balance of payments problems.
Let me turn now to the role of our allies.
We are urging our pa.rtnen In NATO to do
more tor the co=on defense, but we by no
means carry the entire burden. While the
U.S. contribution Ia highly slgnVJ,cant, our
allies contribute to NATO nearly 90 percent
ot Its ground forces, 80 percent of Its seapower, and 75 percent or Its ~wer. In central Europe, the allies supply 25 of the 29
combat-ready divisions. They have over three
mUllon men in aotlve service today--one
third more than the United States has
throughout the world.
Perhaps most Important our NATO partners have substantially Increased their defense elfort In recent years. Since 1970 they
have raised their defeil,le expenl11tures by 30
percilnt to a level of •311 billion In 1973.
Through the European Defense Improvement Program they are !ulftlllng their commitment to procure major new Items of mUItary equipment anl1 to construct tnstella.tlons, In order to achieve a more etrectlve
conventional defense.
Our antes are also taking a number of
steps to help the United States with both Its
m1lltary balance or payments and budgetary
problem.a.
Ae I have already noted, the German Government, in addition to substantial arms
purchases In the Unltel1 States, has also purcha.eed $621 million In U.S. Government
-medium term securities on which It pays the
Interest and ha.s put $188 million into the
rehabilitation or U.S. barracks In Germany,
benefttlng both our J>alance of payments and
our budget costs. The total value or this
olfset agreement to the U .S. has been aPproximately $2 bUllon over a two-year
period.
We are now negotiating another olfset
agreement wlth the Federal Republic.
In addltlon, and important !or the long
run, NATO's defense mln1Sters last month
agreed to examine the problem of findllig
additional multllateral means to reduce the
adverse economic consequences borne by the
United States as a result of Its stationing
forces In Europe. We conelder this a major
step that can reduce the balance of payments
Impact and the Incremental bul1getary burlien of stationing forces abroad rather than
at home.
Let me turn now to the fourth basic area
of mlsui111erstandlng. Some argue that Amef-
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lean and NATO forces are not a serious fightIng 'force and could not withstand a Soviet
assault. Thrls Is simply not true. NATO Is
a formidable defensive force and not just
e. "Trip wire" a.e some believe. In central
Europe, for example, NATO has available
roughly the same number of forces as the
Warsaw Pact. And NATO Is now engaged In
developing a further program of specific force
Improvements that will ensure an adequate
defense for the rest of this decade.
But NATO could be forced Into a "trip
wire" posture, In~ having to resort to nuclear weapons 1n a matter of days or even
hours, If th.e United States were to unilaterally withdraw a substantial number of Its
forces.
This would be an extremely dangerous
situation In today's world. The doctrine of
"massive retaliation" bec&me Inadequate
when the Soviet Union became a real nuclear power able tO retaliate In kind. That
Is why l·t Is surprising to hear proposals to
defend western Europe by depenl1ence upon
nuclear weapons alone. This ba.ckdoor revival of the doctrine of massive retaliation
coincides with the emergence or something
like parity In strategic weapons systems between the United States and the Soviet
Union. But nuclear parity makes massive
retallatloa less bellevable as a means of deterring all forms of aggreBBion In Europe.
The proposed return to this concept, whether
tt Is ce.llel1 "masalve retaliation" or "trip
wire", a.s a substitute for NATO's agreed
flexible response capabllity reflects one or two
things: either a. misunderstanding of the
lmpllcatlone_of atra.teglo parity, or a cavalier
dismissal of the poeslbU!ty of lese than allout war In Europe.
Let me conclude. We are not asking the
Congrese to agree that we should retain the
present level of our forces l,n Europe indefinitely. We are convinced that this Is neither
wiSe nor neceBB&ry.
But we are equally convinced that the
manner In which we reduce these forces Is at
least as Important a.e the reductions themselves.
We want to bring a.bout these reductionS
In a way which W1ll neither damage the Atlantic Alliance nor tempt our adversaries to
return to a policy of aggressive confrontation.
As I have already noted, we are moving
vigorously on three fronts:
First, In NATO we are developing a multilateral mechaniSm !or more equitable burden-sharing and we are revising some basic
defense cpncepts to allow for more efficient
use of scarce defense resources.
Second, In this Year of Europe we are
seeking w re!iOlve the Inter-related Issues
of trade, finance and security In a cooperative and mutually beneficial manner, and
Third, In allghtly more than 90 days we
will begin unprecedented negotiations with
the Soviet Union and the nations of eastern
Europe to mutually reduce the forces st111
confronting one another In the heart of
Europe.
Surely this Is a progra.m worth thls Congress' most serious consideration. We ask
only for the time to carry It out. _

